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ABSTRACT 
EXPLORING A MULTIFACTORIAL, CLINICAL MODEL OF THOUGHT 
DISORDER: APPLICATION OF A DIMENSIONAL, TRANSDIAGNOSTIC 
APPROACH 
Mara A. Hart 
July 29, 2016 
 Background: Bleuler saw thought disorder as the core defining feature of 
psychotic phenomena, reflective of the “splitting of the psychic functions” that occurred 
when, in the process of thinking, one’s ideas and feelings disconnect, becoming 
fragmented and competing functions. Unfortunately, interest in thought disorder as the 
conceptual core of psychosis was lost with rise of the modern DSM system, paralleling 
the shift towards a more simplistic, categorical way of defining psychiatric disorders.  
 Aims: This study examined thought disorder from a dimensional perspective, with 
the aim of disentangling qualitative heterogeneity and diverse sources of influence. 
Analyses were based on a large, transdiagnostic sample (n = 322), including individuals 
diagnosed with schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, and bipolar disorder. Structural 
equation modeling was used to estimate the unique and combined effects of family 
psychiatric history, age-at-onset, affective state, and sex on two dimensions of thought 
disorder, namely idiosyncratic thinking and combinatory thinking. We also explored the 
utility of categorical (i.e. DSM) diagnosis, by estimating the relative proportion of 




Results: The overall model accounted for 11% of variance in idiosyncratic 
thinking and 3% of the variance in combinatory thinking. Negative affect was the 
strongest predictor of idiosyncratic thinking (r = .27), although this effect was 
significantly more robust in those with a family history of psychosis (r = .37) compared 
to those without (r = .02). DSM diagnosis was a significant predictor of IV, explaining
 
7% of unique variance when entered into the full model compared to 9% of the variance 
when estimated independently, which suggests that the portion of variance explained by 
diagnosis was largely independent of
 
other predictors in the model. 
 
 Discussion: The pattern of associations among family psychiatric history, age-at-
onset, and negative affect that predicted idiosyncratic thinking are suggestive of a 
developmental process. This hypothesis is explored in the context of previous research. 
The broad implications of this research on the classification and study of psychosis is also 
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 Thought is a complex and uniquely-human phenomenon, through which our 
understanding of self, world, and reality is constructed. Connected to our capacity for 
language, thought is critical to communication and plays an important role in how we 
understand others and make our own experiences known. Said simply, “the use of words 
reflects [the] organization of the inner world of thought” (Lidz, 1973). Breakdowns in the 
thought system (e.g., how one perceives, interprets, structures, and responds to 
information) is intrinsically linked to difficulties with psychological wellbeing and the 
ability to function adaptively in the world. At its extreme, these disturbances are the core 
of psychotic experiences. In fact, disturbances in thought have been central to the 
conceptualization of psychosis since Emil Kraepelin introduced the first formal 
diagnostic construct, dementia praecox, which would later be reformulated as 
“schizophrenia” by his successor, Eugen Bleuler.  
 Kraepelin’s application of a disease model to the classification of psychological 
disturbances had a profound and enduring impact on the conceptualization and study of 
psychosis. He defined dementia praecox as a dementing disease, characterized by a 
progressive deterioration of mental functions beginning in early life. He viewed language 
as an important marker of cognitive processes, describing “derailments” and 
“incoherence” in patients’ speech as reflective of underlying thought disturbances. 
Kraepelin acknowledged the clinical variability of dementia praecox, noting that the 
“disease picture appears so varied that upon superficial observation the fundamental 
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symptoms are not recognizable” (Adams & Sutker, 2000, p. 405). While anxiety, 
hallucinations, delusions, attentional difficulties, loss of interest and pleasure, and lack of 
volition were common features of dementia praecox, symptoms alone had little 
diagnostic significance in his system (Adams & Sutker, 2000). Despite his appreciation 
for clinical heterogeneity, Kraepelin believed that a precise taxonomy of 
psychopathology would lead to the identification of discrete disease processes.  
 Bleuler sought to refine the dementia praecox construct, describing the 
dimensional nature of psychotic phenomena, which he viewed as existing on a continuum 
with normal experience. He conceptualized “schizophrenia” in terms of internal 
psychological processes and, with this, detailed the vast clinical heterogeneity among 
patients. For Bleuler, the essence of schizophrenia was in the “splitting” of mental 
functions, in which the psychological force that holds together facets of the psyche—
perception, affect, memory, thought, behavior—breaks down in some way. The primary 
manifestation of splitting was disturbed thinking, which he observed in the speech of 
patients. He described subtle phenomenological differences in the form of thought 
disturbances, detailing processes in which “the most important determinant of the 
associations is lacking… the concept of purpose” (p. 15) and others in which  
“associations do not become entirely senseless, but they still appear odd, bizarre, 
distorted” (p. 19). For Bleuler, clinical heterogeneity was critical to understanding the 
nature of psychosis. Unlike Kraepelin, he believed schizophrenia to have multiple  
etiologies, involving biological, developmental, and social mechanisms, which underlay 
differences in clinical picture. 
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When the first Diagnostic and Statistical Manual was published in 1952, 
disturbances in thought remained central to the conceptualization of psychosis. The 
category of “schizophrenic reactions” was defined as “represent[ing] a group of psychotic 
reactions characterized by fundamental disturbances in reality relationships and concept 
formations, with affective, behavioral, and intellectual disturbances in varying degrees 
and mixtures. The disorders are marked by strong tendency to retreat from reality, by 
emotional disharmony, [and] unpredictable disturbances in stream of thought” (DSM, 
1952, p. 26). The conceptualization and classification of disorders in the DSM-I was 
rooted heavily in the psychodynamic orientation of the time and did not delineate clear 
boundaries between normal behavior and pathology.  
The complex and functional view of “psychoses” was retained with the release of 
the second edition in 1968, as was the centrality of thought disorder. Schizophrenia was 
described as a “large category” (p. 33), characterized by “disturbances in thinking [that] 
are marked by alterations of concept formation which may lead to misinterpretation of 
reality and sometimes to delusions and hallucinations, which frequently appear 
psychologically self-protective” (DSM-II, 1968, p. 33).  
Release of the DSM-III in 1980 marked a turning point in the conceptualization 
and classification of psychosis. Responding to growing skepticism regarding the 
legitimacy of psychiatry as a scientific discipline, the DSM-III aimed to disseminate a 
common nomenclature and establish reliability of psychiatric diagnosis. The detailed 
descriptions of “schizophrenic reactions” (DSM, 1952) and “the schizophrenias” (DSM-
II, 1962) were replaced by sets of observable, categorical criteria and rigid diagnostic 
boundaries. In the interest of inter-rater reliability, hallucinations and delusions (i.e. 
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content of thought), once considered “accessory symptoms” by Bleuler, were redefined 
as the core characteristics of schizophrenia. Thought disorder (i.e. form of thought) was 
placed under the heading of “other characteristic symptoms,” defined as “incoherence, 
derailment (loosening of associations), marked illogicality, or marked poverty of content 
of speech." The complexity and conceptual significance of thought disturbances was 
further reduced with the revision of schizophrenia in the DSM-IV, referred to as simply 
“disorganized speech.” 
The transformation of the DSM over the past 60 years reflects a growing effort to 
standardize psychiatric diagnosis in order to improve professional communication, 
facilitate research progress, and guide treatment decisions. Unfortunately, with the shift 
toward categorical classification has come the assumption of mental disorders as discrete 
disease entities, an overly simplistic view of psychological disturbances that has had 
unintended consequences for how we understand and study these phenomena. As written 
by Jaspers (1963), “when we design a diagnostic schema, we can only do so if we forego 
something at the outset……and in the face of facts we have to draw the line where none 
exists…. A classification therefore has only provisional value. It is a fiction which will 
discharge its function if it proves to be the most apt for the time” (p. 605).
 
When Kraepelin applied a disease-model to the classification of psychopathology, 
it was with the expectation that defining syndromes at the symptom-level would facilitate 
discovery of underlying biological causes of mental disorders. Thus, despite his belief 
that dementia praecox was a disease of the brain, he accepted this as tentative until it 
could be demonstrated empirically. In fact, Kraepelin was explicit about the evidence 
Limitations of DSM Classification 
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required to establish nosological entities, stating that “similar disease processes will 
produce identical symptom pictures, identical pathological anatomy, and an identical 
etiology (1907, p. 117).” Years later, these criteria were revisited by Robins and Guze 
(1970), who developed a framework for establishing the validity of diagnostic constructs. 
They proposed that a meaningful diagnostic entity should: (1) represent a cohesive 
clinical construct; (2) be distinct from other disorders; (3) accurately predict course, 
prognosis, and treatment response; (4) aggregate in families; (5) have clear and consistent 
biological markers.  
Schizophrenia-spectrum disorders (i.e. schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, & 
schizophreniform) and affective psychoses (i.e. bipolar & major depressive disorders) are 
associated with a significant degree of clinical heterogeneity, which has long been 
recognized as an obstacle to research and clinical progress. Since development of DSM-
III (APA, 1980), the classification of psychiatric disorders has been based on polythetic 
criteria, in which each disorder is defined by a list of possible symptoms, but not all are 
needed for diagnosis. Inherent to this approach is a high degree of clinical heterogeneity 
within diagnostic categories. Take, for instance, the DSM-IV (2000) construct of 
schizophrenia, which is defined by the presence of any two (or more) of five core criteria 
or one of three “special” symptoms. This amounts to twenty-nine distinct symptom 
profiles all subsumed under the diagnosis of schizophrenia. The clinical picture of bipolar 
disorder is comparably diverse, such that two patients can have the same diagnosis, but 
share no common symptoms. Further, because the same symptoms can present across 
multiple disorders, it is possible for individuals with similar clinical features to hold 
different diagnoses.  
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There is also considerable variation within individual diagnostic criteria resulting 
from the reduction of broad symptom dimensions into dichotomous categories. This is 
well illustrated by the heterogeneity of hallucinatory experiences, which vary in form 
(e.g., auditory, visual, gustatory, etc.), tone (e.g., derogatory, violent, reassuring, etc.), 
and severity across individuals, but are assumed to be equivalent in the DSM system. In 
addition to the poor specificity of clinical criteria, there is also significant variability in 
the onset, course, and outcomes of symptoms, which is not accounted for by diagnosis 
(Wright et al., 2013). A major point of criticism of the DSM system has been the virtual 
lack of evidence supporting its utility to describe behavior, predict outcomes, or guide 
treatment decisions (Lillienfeld & Treadway, 2016). 
Influenced by Kraepelin’s disease perspective, construction of the modern DSM 
system was based on the assumption that mental disorders are discrete, biologically-
determined entities. Despite accumulated evidence contradicting the validity of 
diagnostic categories, this assumption continues to have a powerful influence on how we 
understand and study psychological disturbances. Recent advances in neuroimaging and 
genetics have facilitated investigation into the biological underpinnings of mental 
disorders, results of which have illustrated a complex and non-specific etiological 
perspective. While certain neurological patterns have been associated with schizophrenia, 
effects have been small with significant variability across individuals. Similarly, 
molecular genetics studies of schizophrenia have implicated a large number of associated 
genes with very small effects, results which are not indicative of a genetic disorder. This 
is consistent with findings from heritability studies, which support a model of generalized 
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risk for psychiatric conditions instead of disorder-specific aggregation within families 
(DeVylder & Lukens, 2013; Fusar-Poli et al., 2013; Rasic et al. 2013).  
Dimension-Focused Approach 
Progress in understanding psychotic phenomena is contingent upon the clarity and 
precision of the constructs that we study. This was an area pioneered by Paul Meehl 
(1955, 1962), who sought to explore the natural distribution of psychotic phenomena 
without a priori assumptions about the structure of data. Meehl believed that latent 
categories of psychopathology do exist, but have to be empirically distinguished from 
latent continua. Others oppose syndromal classification, arguing the need for alternative 
approaches to better capture clinical heterogeneity and disentangle complexity at the 
etiological level.  
A large body of conceptual and empirical literature has addressed the 
heterogeneity problem and introduced alternative systems for classifying and studying 
psychosis (Andreasen, 2007; Tsuang, Lyons, & Faraone, 1990). One such approach has 
focused on the study of symptom dimensions, backed by empirical validation, including 
evidence of symptom-specific heritability (Buchanan & Carpenter, 1994; Strauss, 
Carpenter, & Bartko, 1974). In recent years, domain- or dimension-based studies have 
become increasingly prevalent in psychological science (Berenbaum, 2013). This 
approach has gained wide acceptance in the field of personality research, contributing to 
an advanced understanding of the structure and etiology of personality pathology 
(Krueger & Piasecki, 2001).  
Dimensional frameworks also have a long history in psychosis research. In 1974, 
well before release of the DSM-III, Strauss and colleagues proposed the Domains of 
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Pathology model, which deconstructed six psychotic dimensions: disorders of content of 
thought and perception, disorders of affect, disorders of personal relationships, disordered 
speech and thought, disordered motor behaviors, and lack of insight. Reiterations of this 
approach have followed, including Buchanan and Carpenter’s Domains of 
Psychopathology (1980) and Peralta and Cuesta’s Psychopathological Dimensions 
(2001). More recently, the domain-based approach was endorsed by the National Institute 
of National Health (NIMH), who introduced their Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) in 
2008, initiating a shift away from categorical diagnosis towards an empirically-driven, 
symptom-based taxonomy. Despite having yet to become the dominant paradigm in 
psychological science, domain-based research has yielded promising evidence, 
elucidating clearer links among psychotic experiences, etiological factors, and outcomes 
(Dutta et al., 2007; Leask, Vermunt, Done, Crow, Blows, & Boks, 2009; Peralta & 
Cuesta, 2007; Van Os et al., 1999).  
The traditional conceptualization of psychotic experiences as categorical 
constructs is increasingly refuted (Read, Mosher, & Bentall, 2004). With this, there is 
growing acceptance that psychotic phenomena exist on a continuum with normal 
experience, supported by the well-documented prevalence of subtle psychotic 
experiences in the general population (Johns & VanOs, 2001). The continuous nature of 
psychotic symptoms is purported to have etiological significance, corresponding with 
models of complex risk. As support for the continuum model has become more 
widespread, so has recognition of the inadequacy of categorical measurement approaches 
(Krueger & Piasecki, 2001; Lenzenweger, 2010). Dimensional assessment of symptoms 
Dimensional Measurement: Capturing the Psychosis Continuum  
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has superior validity compared to categorical approaches (e.g., rating scales), as they are 
better able to capture the natural distribution of psychosis phenotypes (Dutta et al., 2013; 
Esterberg & Compton, 2009). In terms of methodology, they are more sensitive to subtle 
forms of pathology that may be overlooked by categorical methods. Given their increased 
sensitivity to detect differences in psychotic experiences, continuous measures maximize 
statistical power and enhance the meaningfulness of data. Additionally, continuous data 
permit the use of sophisticated statistical techniques, which are valuable when modeling 
multifactorial relationships (Krueger & Piasecki, 2001). Despite conceptual and empirical 
advantages, continuous measurement is not the norm in psychopathology research. 
Consequently, availability of psychometrically-established assessment instruments is 
limited.  
Thought disorder (TD) is a complex and multidimensional construct, reflecting 
peculiarities in thinking, language, and communication.  Broadly, TD is defined as any 
disturbance that affects the form of thinking, including the organization, control, 
processing, or expression of thoughts. Given the breadth of the construct, TD has been 
defined and classified in a number of different ways. Different perspectives have placed 
varying emphasis on features related to the contextual appropriateness of ideas, the way 
in which they are organized, and the language used to express them.   
 A variety of approaches have been developed to measure TD, including 
reasoning tasks, clinician rating scales, and self-report measures. Perhaps the most 
widely-used medium has been the Rorschach inkblot test, which has a rich history in the 
measurement of disordered thinking and been the basis of several scoring systems. The 
Thought Disorder: Conceptualization and Assessment 
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Rorschach lends itself well to TD assessment, as it is a relatively standardized technique 
with an unstructured format that allows examinees to interpret and structure the task 
freely (Singer & Wynne, 1964). Its projective nature offers a glimpse into how an 
individual perceives, interprets, and responds to ambiguous stimuli. As described by 
Singer, Wynne, & Toohey (1978), the Rorschach constitutes “an analogue of those many 
daily occurrences in which two or more individuals attempt to establish a consensually 
shared view of an ambiguous reality.”  
 The use of the Rorschach in assessing thinking disturbances can be traced back to 
Rorschach himself, who observed a characteristic style of responding in psychotic 
protocols. He described a tendency for these individuals to formulate responses based on 
absurd, narrow details of the blot (i.e. ignoring typical determinants of form, color, and 
shading), often ascribing idiosyncratic or personal meaning to perceptual features 
(Kleiger, 1999). Building upon Rorschach’s work, Rapaport sought to develop a more 
formal system for classifying thought disturbances, which he referred to as “deviant 
verbalizations.” With this, he introduced the concept of “distance,” which served as the 
foundation of his approach. He believed adaptive thinking was a function of the 
integration of perceptual (e.g., blot features) and associative (e.g., internal ideas, 
memories, feelings) processes. The relative pull of one process over the other resulted in 
either a loss or increase of distance, from which thought disturbances arose. A loss of 
perceptual distance reflected a tendency to see the blot as too real, while an increase of 
perceptual distance was associated with an overly-symbolic view of percepts. Rapaport’s 
scoring system included 21 categories of disordered thinking, reflecting disturbances in 
perception, synthesis, interpretation, and expression of responses.  
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Rapaport’s system became the basis for the Delta Index (Watkins & Stauffacher, 
1952), the first standardized assessment to exclusively measure disordered thinking. The 
Delta Index included 15 of Rapaport’s scoring categories, each of which was assigned to 
a four-point level of severity. The Delta Index was innovative, in that it captured the 
multifaceted and continuous nature of TD. For this reason, the scale was revised decades 
later by Johnston and Holzman, who developed the Thought Disorder Index based on it.  
Thought Disorder Index. The Thought Disorder Index (TDI; Johnston & 
Holzman, 1979) provides a system for identifying, categorizing, and evaluating the 
severity of disordered thinking as expressed in language. TDI scoring can be based on 
any verbal sample, including the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS), but is most 
commonly derived from verbatim responses to the Rorschach Inkblot Test (Rorschach, 
1921). The Rorschach is believed to elicit greater instances of thought disorder than more 
structured methods (Johnston & Holzman, 1979), such as interviews (e.g., the Scale for 
the Assessment of Thought, Language, and Communication) and non-projective tests 
(e.g., WAIS).  
The TDI specifies 23 categories of thought disturbances, most of which are based 
on Rappaport’s original classification (see Appendix A). Because TD is understood as 
existing on a continuum, each category is assigned to a level of severity, ranging from 
mild to severe (.25, .50, .75, and 1.00), mirroring the structure of the Delta Index. The .25 
level reflects subtle instances of cognitive slippage, which are commonly observed in 
healthy individuals, particularly in times of anxiety, stress, and fatigue (Johnston & 
Holzman, 1986). Disturbances at the .50 level “convey[s] an impression of loss of 
mooring, shaky reality contact, emotional overreaction, and distinct oddness” (Johnston 
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& Holzman, 1986, p. 490). Significant instability in thinking and perceiving is 
represented at the .75 level, while responses at the 1.0 level indicate a complete break 
from reality. 
In developing the TDI, Johnston and Holzman (1979) distinguished four 
qualitative dimensions of TD based on the conceptual relatedness of individual 
categories. These include:  
• Associative Looseness, in which responses appear to be driven by 
internal processes instead of demands of the task;  
• Combinatory Thinking, in which percepts, ideas, or images are 
joined in an inappropriate, incongruous or unrealistic manner;  
• Disorganized Responses, in which a lack of clarity of thought and 
sense of confusion are displayed;  
• Deviant Verbalizations, in which word usage is odd, 
idiosyncratic, or undecipherable  
A subsequent factor analysis yielded six discrete factors that partially overlapped 
with the original, conceptually-derived dimensions (Shenton et al., 1987). These 
dimensions, named “empiric factors,” included: (1) combinatory thinking; (2) 
idiosyncratic verbalizations; (3) autistic thinking; (4) fluid thinking; (5) absurdity; (6) 
confusion. 
The TDI is a highly sensitive measure of thought disorder and thus is able to 
detect subtle disturbances in language that may be overlooked using other methods. This 
is facilitated by the scoring protocol, as ratings are based on written transcriptions of 
verbal samples, which allows for systematic analysis of thought disturbances, in terms of 
qualitative form and severity. While this approach has clear advantages as a research tool, 
it is cumbersome to administer and score, which limits its utility in clinical settings. 
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Scale for the Assessment of Thought, Language, and Communication. 
Alternative approaches to assessing thought disorder have been developed that are not as 
methodologically rigorous. Of these measures, the Scale for the Assessment of Thought, 
Language, and Communication (TLC; Andreasen, 1979a; 1979b; 1986) is perhaps the 
most widely-used clinician-rated assessment of thought disorder in research and clinical 
practice. Its development was undertaken as part of the broader objective to establish a 
standard set of thought disorder subtypes for inclusion in the glossary of the DSM-III. 
Subtypes were identified and defined based strictly on clinical observation, with no 
assumptions of underlying etiological mechanisms. This atheoretical approach was 
assumed deliberately in the service of designing an instrument with high inter-rater 
reliability and clinical utility (Andreasen, 1979a). The original definitions were piloted in 
a small sample of patients (n = 44) and subsequently revised to improve clarity. The 
severity of each item is rated on a 4-or 5-point scale, ranging from “absent” to “severe.” 
These anchor points are defined quantitatively (e.g., speech behavior occurs 5 to 10 times 
during interview) and are item-specific. In addition to the relative severity of each item, 
thought disorder subtypes are identified as “more pathological” (e.g., poverty of speech, 
pressure of speech, clanging) or “less pathological” (e.g., circumstantiality, perseveration, 
blocking; Andreasen, 1986). Thus, items are not equally weighted in determination of 
global thought disorder severity.    
Several studies have examined the factor structure of the TLC, with mixed results. 
In her early examination of the TLC, Andreasen (1979b) conducted an exploratory factor 
analysis of 12 TLC items, which yielded a single “verbosity” factor, on which derailment, 
illogicality, loss of goal, perseveration, incoherence, and pressure of speech loaded 
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positively and poverty of speech loaded negatively. This suggests that poverty of speech 
is a comparable indicator of verbosity, although measured inversely. Nonetheless, results 
were interpreted as evidencing distinct “positive” (florid) and “negative” (diminished) 
dimensions of thought disorder. In a subsequent factor analysis of the complete TLC, 
Andreasen and Grove (1986) reported three distinct domains, represented as Fluent 
Disorganization, Emptiness, and Linguistic Control. A comparable three-factor model 
was generated from an exploratory factor analysis of eight TLC items (Berenbaum et al., 
1985) and later replicated through confirmatory factor analysis (Harvey et al., 1992). 
Interestingly, however, the inclusion of all 18 TLC items has typically revealed a more 
complex factor structure, with six to seven distinct dimensions (i.e. Cuesta & Peralta, 
1992; Cuesta & Peralta, 1999; Peralta et al., 1992). Taken together, these data illustrate 
the potentially problematic impact of methodology on conceptual models.  
The TLC is a generally reliable measure, with high clinical utility. Rating scales 
can be advantageous, as they are well-defined, structured, and facilitate communication 
among treatment providers. Further, TLC ratings can be based on a standard clinical 
interview and scoring can be completed quickly. Despite these strengths, the TLC has 
several disadvantages as a research tool. A general disadvantage of rating scales is that 
they yield categorical data (Lenzenweger, 2010). This is particularly problematic in the 
study of thought disorder, as categorical measures do not adequately capture the 
continuous nature of the construct. Further, because assessing the nuances of language is 
inherently challenging, ratings of thought disorder made in real-time or from memory are 
susceptible to examiner bias. The TLC does not control for speech output, although 
fluency has been shown to correlate with severity. Consequently, greater weight is given 
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to “positive” disturbances (e.g., pressure of speech, looseness, tangentiality, etc.), as they 
are directly related to increased verbal output. On the other hand, the TLC tends to 
underrepresent “negative” disturbances (e.g., poverty of speech, poverty of speech 
content), which are more difficult to assess through observation and comprise only 3 of 
the 18 items. While the positive/negative distinction appears to be a valuable heuristic for 
clinical practice, the TLC is not sensitive to different forms of thought disorder.  
Diagnosis-Based Study of Thought Disorder. 
Thought disorder has been the topic of extensive study over the past several 
decades. Unfortunately, the majority of this research has been based on broad diagnostic 
categories, results of which do not clearly inform a dimensional model. Nonetheless, it is 
important to reexamine this evidence from a dimensional perspective.   
For much of the 20th century, TD was widely-accepted as a schizophrenia-specific 
feature and studied within this context. This perspective shifted in the 1970s, with 
recognition that thought disturbances were also prevalent in mania, spurring considerable 
efforts to identify patterns of thought disorder that differentiated diagnostic groups (see 
Appendix B). The earliest of these studies, which assessed thought disorder using abstract 
reasoning tasks (e.g., Gorham’s Proverbs Test), demonstrated that under-inclusive 
thinking tended to characterize schizophrenia, while over-inclusive thinking was more 
typical of mania (Andreasen & Powers, 1974; Breakey & Goodell, 1972). Using this 
approach, depressed patients have been shown to exhibit deficits characterized by under-
inclusive and concrete thinking compared to controls, although to a lesser degree than 
schizophrenic patients (Braff, Glick, & Griffin, 1983; Braff et al., 1988).  
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Similar patterns were found in a series of later studies using the TLC, with 
poverty of speech and speech content (i.e. negative thought disorder) common to 
schizophrenia and pressured speech, tangentiality, incoherence, illogicality, and loss of 
goal characterizing mania (i.e. positive thought disorder) (Andreasen, 1979b; Andreasen, 
1984; Andreasen & Grove, 1986; Docherty, Schnur, & Harvey, 1988; Harvey, 1984). 
However, inconsistent evidence has also been reported, with several studies finding 
greater tangentiality, looseness, and illogicality in schizophrenia compared to mania 
(Cuesta & Peralta, 1993; Jampala et al., 1989; Ragin & Oltmanns, 1987). Schizoaffective 
patients were included in only two studies, both of which evidenced thought disorder 
profiles comparable to manic patients (Andreasen & Grove, 1986; Ragin & Oltmanns, 
1987). Examining differences by schizophrenia subtype, Andreasen and Grove (1986) 
reported a significantly higher prevalence of poverty of speech content in patients with 
hebephrenic versus paranoid schizophrenia (Andreasen & Grove, 1986).  
The presence of negative thought disorder has been evidenced in patients with 
primary depression, although overall TLC severity tends to be considerably lower than 
that of schizophrenia and mania (Andreasen, 1979b; Ragin & Oltmanns, 1987; Wilcox et 
al., 2000). Further, patients diagnosed with psychotic depression tend to exhibit 
significantly greater alogia, poverty of content, blocking, and perseveration than their 
non-psychotic counterparts (Wilcox et al., 2000).   
 A series of studies by Holzman and colleagues examined the form and severity of 
thought disorder in schizophrenia, mania, and schizoaffective disorder using the TDI 
(Holzman et al., 1986; Johnston & Holzman, 1979; Shenton et al., 1986; Solovay et al., 
1986). Results evidenced disorder-specific patterns of thought disorder, in which 
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schizophrenia was characterized by “fluid thinking, interpenetrations of one idea by 
another, unstable verbal referents, and overly concise and contracted communications 
which give the impression of inner turmoil and confusion (p. 369).” Conversely, manic 
thought processes were described as “loosely tied together ideas that are excessively and 
immoderately combined and elaborated” with “a playful, mirthful, and breezy quality to 
their productions (Holzman et al., 1986, p. 369).” Contrary to the findings of Andreasen 
and Grove (1986), Johnston and Holzman reported no significant differences in TDI 
scores between paranoid and non-paranoid patients.  
The pattern of thought disorder in schizoaffective patients was less consistent, as 
significant differences were found between those in manic and depressed states. 
Schizoaffective – manic patients exhibited a high level of combinatory thinking 
comparable to manic patients. However, they lacked the characteristic flippancy and 
humor of the manic patients and resembled the schizophrenic patient in terms of their 
frequency of idiosyncratic verbalizations, confusion, and autistic thinking. The 
schizoaffective – depressed patients were similar to the schizophrenic group in terms of 
frequency of absurd responses and relatively constricted protocol length. However, they 
had very low levels of thought disorder overall, with TDI scores largely resembling 
healthy controls. In contrast, their rate of absurd responses was similar to the 
schizophrenic group. 
Despite evidence of differences in qualitative form and severity across disorders, 
the variability in thought disorder presentation is not fully explained by diagnostic 
groupings. Heuristically, comparative studies of thought disorder consistently report 
significant within-group variance (i.e. large standard deviations) in TDI total and factor 
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scores, across diagnostic and control groups. This point was empirically demonstrated 
using discriminant-function analysis, which found that TDI total scores correctly 
classified only 63.0% of manic and schizophrenic patients (Solovay, Shenton, & 
Holzman, 1986). Qualitative factors were shown to more accurately differentiate groups, 
as a subset of five empirically-derived categories (irrelevant intrusions, combinatory 
thinking, fluid thinking, confusion, and idiosyncratic verbalization) correctly classified 
76.5% of the sample. However, when re-examined in a subsequent study that also 
included a schizoaffective subsample, the accuracy rate of the same factors dropped to 
57.7% (Shenton, Solovay, & Holzman, 1987).  
Course and Chronicity. The course of thought disorder is highly variable across 
individuals. Diagnosis has been shown to account for a portion of this variance. It is well-
evidenced that thought disorder in schizophrenia is more stable and persistent compared 
to schizoaffective disorder and affective psychoses (Harvey & Earle-Boyer, 1986; 
Marengo & Harrow, 1988). Thought disorder in mania has been described as “reversible” 
(Andreasen & Grove, 1986), as disturbances are typically severe during acute phases of 
illness (e.g., hospital admission) and remit completely following treatment (Andreasen & 
Grove, 1986; Docherty, Schnur, & Harvey, 1988; Harrow & Marengo, 1986; Marengo & 
Harrow, 1987). Remission of positive thought disorder has also been observed in 
schizophrenic patients (Andreasen & Grove, 1986), suggesting that some subtypes tend 
to follow an episodic course, independent of diagnosis. Consistently, forms of thought 
disorder that are characteristic of schizophrenia have been shown to have greater stability 
over time, including higher-level disturbances (i.e. 0.50, 0.75) on the TDI (Metsänen et 
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al., 2006) and idiosyncratic verbalizations (Braff et al., 1988; Harrow & Marengo, 1986; 
Metsänen et al., 2006). 
Summary. Research has consistently shown differences in the form and severity 
of thought disorder across diagnostic groups using both the TLC and TDI. Broadly, 
thinking in schizophrenia is characterized by odd, impoverished, and internally-driven 
speech. Classically “schizophrenic” thought disorder tends to have greater stability over 
time, with slight increases during acute phases of illness. The disconnected and 
elaborated thinking disturbances seen in mania tend to be episodic, emerging during 
acute phases and typically remitting completely with treatment. As measured by the TDI, 
combinatory thinking is indicative of acute psychological distress, while “thought 
disorganization” (e.g., vagueness, perseveration, inappropriate distance, confusion, 
looseness, fluidity, absurd responses, and incoherence) appears to reflect a more stable 
trait. It has been posited that the stable thought disturbances common to schizophrenia are 
pathognomonic of underlying pathophysiology, while sporadic forms are secondary to 
clinical and situational factors (Levy et al., 2010; Walberg et al., 2001).  
Despite the high degree of within-subjects variability across studies, these data 
demonstrate a clear association between thought disorder and diagnosis. The nature of 
this relationship is less clear. It is possible that these findings reflect an association 
between thought disorder and certain clinical or personal features related to diagnosis, 
such as symptoms, medication, or social functioning. In this case, diagnosis contains 
important information about the nature of thought disorder that warrants further study. 
An alternative explanation is that thought and language characteristics play an influential 
role in clinical diagnosis, thereby making evidence of their relationship tautological.     
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Central to Bleuler’s early conceptualization of schizophrenia was the intrinsic link 
between thinking and affect. For him, the core of psychosis was in the fragmented 
associations among thoughts and feelings, or “splitting.” Since this time, interest in the 
relationship between affect and thought disorder has continued to drive research and 
clinical work.   
  The connection between thinking and affect was observed by Johnston & 
Holzman (1979), who described exacerbations of thought disorder during times of 
increased stress in both psychiatric patients and healthy individuals. Their observations 
stimulated interest in the role of stress sensitivity as a marker of psychosis liability; they 
questioned “is thought disorder unique to schizophrenics, or is everyone susceptible to it 
if subjected to enough stress? Or does such susceptibility vary among individuals (-) 
some requiring little stress of thinking to become disordered, others requiring greater 
amounts, and still others remaining quite immune to such disorganization no matter what 
the stress” (p. 54)? They speculated that “thought disorder reflects a predisposition in 
some vulnerable people to react to stress by becoming less able to conceptualize, focus 
attention, and reason logically” and “that persons with manifest thought disorder require 
less stress than do normal people for their thinking to be affected” (p. 54). Unfortunately, 
Johnston and Holzman never sought empirical answers to these questions. However, they 
provide a compelling theory about the nature of psychopathology that has contemporary 
relevance.   
Perhaps the earliest study of the impact of stress on TD was conducted by 
Shimkunas (1972), who found that emotionally-salient questions elicited greater thought 
The Significance of Affective Experience in the Etiology of Thought Disorder  
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disorder (as measured by global severity ratings) in schizophrenia when they had 
personal relevance (e.g., “Tell me about your saddest memory”) than general discussion 
of emotional topics. This area of research was later revisited in a series of studies by 
Docherty and colleagues, who examined the impact of affective valence on the clarity of 
communication. They introduced the concept of “affective reactivity” of speech, 
demonstrating that schizophrenic patients exhibited significantly greater referential 
failures during negatively valenced topics compared to positive or neutral topics 
(Docherty et al., 1994; Docherty, Sledge, & Wexler, 1994; Docherty, 1996; Docherty & 
Herbert, 1997; Docherty, Hall, & Gordinier, 1998). Consistent findings were later 
replicated by other researchers (Haddock et al., 1995; Tai, Haddock, & Bentall, 2004).  
Research on affective reactivity of language in mood disorders is limited. 
However, there is evidence that negatively valenced topics exacerbate referential failures 
in manic patients (Tai, Haddock, & Bentall, 2004). Depressed patients, on the other hand, 
have not been found to exhibit affective reactivity of language, although their rate of 
referential failures is typically higher than controls (Docherty, 1996; Rubino et al., 2011; 
Tai, Haddock, & Bentall, 2004). These studies have not compared affective reactivity in 
mood disorders with and without psychotic features. Familial patterns of affective 
reactivity were examined in two studies, results of which indicated that the speech of 
unaffected relatives of schizophrenic patients is not influenced by affective valence 
(Docherty, Sledge, & Wexler, 1994; Docherty, 1996).  
Although affective reactivity in schizophrenia and mania has been well-
established, a high degree of within-group variance exists. Moderators of affective 
reactivity of language have been implicated. It has been suggested that women are more 
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susceptible to disordered thinking in times of stress (Metsänen et al., 2005). Further, 
affective reactivity tends to be greater in patients with positive schizophrenia compared to 
negative schizophrenia (Docherty et al., 1994; Docherty, Sledge, & Wexler, 1994; 
Docherty & Herbert, 1997; Docherty, Hall, & Gordinier, 1998). There is also evidence 
that family psychiatric history moderates the relationship between affective reactivity and 
thought disorder in schizophrenia. Specifically, negative affect has been shown to 
exacerbate thought disorder (as measured by the TLC) in patients with a family history of 
psychosis, but not those without a family history of psychosis (Docherty, Rhinewine, 
Labhart, & Gordinier, 1998). Despite compelling preliminary evidence, research 
examining moderators of affective reactivity is limited. Further study is needed to gain a 
broader understanding of moderating factors and replicate previous results.  
Familial Basis of Thought Disorder and Affective Reactivity 
 Both thought disturbances and affective reactivity have been shown to have 
familial underpinnings. This has been supported by evidence of an over-represented 
aggregation of these traits within families (Docherty et al., 1998; Levy et al., 2010). In 
family studies, psychopathology of relatives has been shown to predict the expression of 
thought disorder and degree of affective reactivity, as well as the interaction between 
them.  
Familial-high risk studies have documented thought disorder in children and 
adolescents who go on to develop psychotic disorders (Bearden et al., 2011; Gooding et 
al., 2012; Metsänen et al., 2004, 2007; Ott, Roberts, Rock, & Erlenmeyer-Kimling, 
2002). Further, TD is common in clinically unaffected relatives of manic and 
schizophrenic patients, differentiating them from relatives of healthy controls (Hain et al., 
 23 
1995; Johnston & Holzman, 1979; Shenton et al., 1989). Interestingly, the type of 
severity of thought disorder has been shown to cluster in families (Berenbaum, Oltmanns, 
& Gottesman, 1985; Shenton et al., 1989).  
As the majority of these studies are biology-focused, findings have largely been 
interpreted as evidence of genetic underpinnings. However, given the correlational nature 
of this research, conclusions drawn from the data are largely speculative. Adoption 
studies have helped to disentangle the genetic and environmental contributions to TD. 
Wahlberg and colleagues (1997) examined the likelihood of TD in adoptees, based on 
genetic-risk (presence or absence of psychotic disorder in biological mother) and 
communication deviance (CD) in adopted parents. Results suggested a significant 
interaction effect, with high-risk adoptees in high CD environments exhibiting the 
greatest TD. Interestingly, high-risk adoptees in low CD families had significantly lower 
TD, suggesting potential protective effects of environment. Results of have demonstrated 
co-familiality of TD independent of shared environmental factors. In a subsequent study, 
Wahlberg and colleagues (2000) replicated these results using the TDI, finding that the 
interaction between high-risk status and CD in adopted parents distinctly predicted 
idiosyncratic thinking in adoptees.   
Taken together, results from family and adoption studies suggest that both genetic 
and environmental influences are involved in the development of TD. The familial basis 
of TD has also been demonstrated from a social-learning perspective. The seminal work 
of Singer and Wynne (1965) provides compelling support for the role of familial 
communication patterns in shaping the development of TD and psychosis. Their Family 
Studies research program at the NIMH grew out of Wynne’s earlier hypothesis about the 
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social-transactional nature of thought disorder, specifically that “the fragmentation of 
experience, the identity diffusion, the disturbed modes of perception and communication, 
and certain other characteristics of the acute reactive schizophrenic's personality structure 
are to a significant extent derived, by processes of internalization, from characteristics of 
the family social organization. Also internalized are the ways of thinking and of deriving 
meaning, the points of anxiety, and the irrationality, confusion, and ambiguity that were 
expressed in the shared mechanisms of the family social organization (Wynne, 1958).”  
 Their research explored how unusual ways in which parents perceived, 
interpreted, and reasoned about the world interfered with their ability to establish shared 
attention and construct mutual meaning with their children. Wynne and Singer posited 
that these disturbed social interactions compromised the child’s development of cohesive, 
stable mental representations of the self and world, thereby putting them at increased risk 
of psychosis. To study this, they devised a system for classifying and scoring dimensions 
of communication deviance based on verbal responses to projective tests (i.e. the 
Thematic Apperception Test and Rorschach).  
 From this, they identified a pattern of CD that reliably predicted the later 
emergence and severity of psychosis in children, broadly characterized by vague, 
fragmented, and contradictory communicating. Interestingly, subtle hindrances to shared 
meaning were more detrimental to the listener (i.e. psychologically) than overt 
disruptions. This pattern was defined by several CD categories, including: (1) closure 
problems, in which the speaker leaves the story hanging or fails to acknowledge a major 
perceptual element of the stimulus (e.g., "Well, this could be the son of this elderly lady 
who's… looks as though he's told his mother, if that’s his mother, some distressing news 
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about something"); (2) disruptive behavior, in which the speaker interrupts the task, by 
asking irrelevant questions or attributing personal, self-referential meaning to the stimuli 
(e.g., “Reminds me of my son contemplating whether he should play the guitar or not...”); 
(3) peculiar language and logic, in which the speaker uses odd phrasing, peculiar 
reasoning, or repetitiveness (e.g., “Maybe it isn't his mother because he wearing an 
overcoat”). 
Collectively, this research suggests that certain forms of TD are part of a 
developmental process, involving both biological and environmental influence. However, 
the relative effects of these mechanisms, and the nature of their interactions is unclear.  
Demographic Factors. 
Age and Gender. Few studies have examined the effects of age and gender on 
thought disorder presentation. Harvey and colleagues (1997) examined thought disorder 
(TLC) in a cross-sectional study of schizophrenic patients, who ranged in age from 19 to 
96. Poverty of speech was more prevalent and severe in older adults (i.e. > 64), while 
“disconnected” speech (e.g., circumstantiality, loss of goal, incoherence, derailment, etc.) 
tended to characterize younger patients. In a younger sample (M = 32.59), Spohn and 
colleagues (1986) found that thought disorder severity (TDR) increased with age (r = 
.323, p < .01). Taken together, it is possible that the severity of thought disorder increases 
across young adulthood and begins to attenuate in later life. However, these studies do 
not account for age-at-onset and chronicity of illness, which could affect cross-sectional 
relationship of thought disorder and age.   
Moderators and Correlates of Thought Disorder 
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 Evidence on the relationship between gender and thought disorder has been 
mixed. Several studies have found thought disorder to be similar in men and women 
(Atalay & Atalay, 2006; Johnston & Holzman, 1979; Perry et al., 1995). While a 
significant correlation between TDR and gender (women exhibited higher TD) was 
evidenced by Spohn and colleagues (1986), this association attenuated significantly after 
controlling for duration of lifetime hospitalizations and global symptom severity. This 
could suggest that clinical factors mediate the effect of gender on TDI; however, this 
relationship may also be an artifact of sampling bias, as the proportion of women (27%) 
was considerably less than that of men. 
	 Race, Social Class, and Education. Several studies have examined effect of 
cultural factors on the measurement of thought disorder. Haimo and Holzman (1979) 
found that total TDI scores did not differ across race, regardless of whether ratings were 
based on Rorschach (TDR) or WAIS (TDw) protocols. This suggests that the TDI 
differentiates characteristics of cultural dialect from thought disorder. The relationship 
between socioeconomic status (SES) and TD was less clear.  In both schizophrenia and 
control groups, SES was positively correlated with TDR scores. SES was similarly related 
to TDw scores in the schizophrenia group; however, in the control group, lower SES was 
associated with higher TDw scores. The explanation for this inconsistency is unclear. 
However, findings suggest that TDI scores based on the WAIS may be more sensitive to 
SES than scores based on the Rorschach.  These results can be compared to the findings 
of Mazumdar and colleagues (1994) who found that poverty of speech on the TLC was 
over-represented in subjects from a rural compared to non-rural background. Higher 
educational status was related to more frequent instances of distractible speech, 
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illogicality, clanging, and neologisms, while perseveration was more common in less 
educated subjects. Although not assessed formally, it is possible that verbal output is 
greater in groups with higher education and SES, in turn contributing to a higher 
frequency of disturbances. Overall, demographic features do not appear strongly related 
to the severity of thought disorder, particularly when using TDR scores. 
Clinical Factors. 
 Medication. The efficacy of neuroleptic medication on thought disorder severity 
has been evidenced by several studies. Hurt and colleagues (1983) assessed changes in 
TDR scores in patients with schizophrenia who were randomly assigned to receive a high 
or low dose of haloperidol, placebo, or no treatment. While thought disorder remained 
stable in both comparison groups across the study period, patients in the treatment 
condition exhibited a significant reduction in TDR scores. Specifically, they showed a 
rapid improvement within the first three days, with the rate of change lessening as the 
study period progressed. Despite the notable reduction in TDR scores, thought disorder 
remained evident in the drug-treated groups at discharge. A notable limitation of this 
study was the administration of only three cards of Rorschach, on which the reliability 
and validity of TDI is unestablished. In a later study, Spohn and colleagues (1986) 
demonstrated a reduction in TDR severity with haloperidol over a 10-week period, with 
residual symptoms persisting throughout the study period. Post-hoc analyses revealed 
that severe forms of thought disorder were more responsive to treatment, while low level 
pathology tended to remain stable. Between-subjects variability was also evidenced by 
Gold and Hurt (1990) in a randomized-control trial of haloperidol. While thought 
disorder improved over the 10-week study period, there was significant variability in the 
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rate of change across patients, which was not explained by baseline severity level. As 
posited by Spohn and colleagues, certain forms of thought disorder may be more 
responsive to treatment than others. However, there is also evidence that neuroleptic 
medication causes a significant reduction in verbal productivity (Bilder et al., 1992), 
suggesting that the treatment-related reduction in thought disorder may be a function of 
decreased verbal output.   
Unfortunately, potential mediators and moderators of psychotropic treatment 
response have not been formally examined. Further, there is limited research on the 
effects of other medications on thought disorder, including second generation 
antipsychotics. A significant treatment effect has been evidenced in a small sample 
receiving various combinations of typical and atypical antipsychotics, as well as mood 
stabilizers and anticholinergics (Goldberg, Dodge, Aloia, Egan, & Weinberger, 2000). 
However, this study did not examine the comparative effects of each drug. Levy et al. 
(1993) demonstrated that methylphenidate significantly increased thought disorder 
severity (TDI) in schizophrenic patients, but had no effect on healthy controls. However, 
a combination of chlorpromazine and methylphenidate has been shown to significantly 
improve language performance and verbal fluency (Bilder et al., 1992). 
 Psychiatric Symptoms. Research on the covariance of thought disorder and other 
symptom dimensions has been inconclusive. Results of factor-analytic studies have been 
highly variable, with TD loading onto positive (i.e. hallucinations and delusions; 
Andreasen & Olsen, 1982) and disorganized (i.e. bizarre behavior, inappropriate affect; 
Picardi et al., 2012) factors, as well as an independent domain (Leask et al., 2009). It is 
unclear whether these inconsistencies are a function of methodological bias or reflect 
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actual variation. However, the use of categorical data in these studies could obscure the 
true latent structure of symptoms.  Several correlational studies have examined 
relationships among thought disorder and other symptom domains. Harrow and Marengo 
(1986) found that thought disorder severity was positively correlated with delusions and 
unrelated to hallucinations in patients with schizophrenia, non-schizophrenia psychoses, 
and non-psychotic disorders. Thought disorder has also been shown to correspond 
longitudinally with clinician-rated scores on the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale, namely 
thought disorder (i.e. hallucinations, unusual thought content, and conceptual 
disorganization) and hostility-suspicion subscales (Hurt, Holzman, & Davis, 1983). 
Cuesta and Peralta (1993) found global symptomatology (Strauss-Carpenter Scale) was 
associated with poverty of speech, poverty of speech content, and blocking on the TLC. 
 Illness Duration. Changes in thought disorder have been evidenced in relation to 
the course of illness. Johnston and Holzman (1979) found differences in TDR among 
recent-onset and chronic schizophrenia patients. The chronically ill group exhibited more 
severe thought disorder, with considerably more absurd and incoherent responses. 
Thought disorder severity has been shown to increase as a function of illness duration 
(Maeda et al., 2007; Spohn et al., 1986) as well as number of hospitalizations (Marengo 
& Harrow, 1997; Spohn et al., 1986). However, inconsistent evidence also exists. For 
instance, Cuesta and Peralta (1993) found that rate of hospitalization was associated with 
perseveration on the TLC, but unrelated to all other items. This null finding may be a 
function of measurement approach, as the restricted range of TLC ratings could obscure 
true relationships. Collectively, these studies imply that the severity of TD may increase 
across the course of chronic illness. However, these data are drawn from cross-sectional 
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research, which makes it difficult to draw conclusions about the longitudinal course of 
thought disorder.    
Summary 
Thought disorder is a complex and dimensional phenomenon. Akin to its clinical 
presentation, the etiology of TD is presumed to be similarly diverse, involving 
interactions among biological, environmental, and psychological factors.  Although 
genetic and neurological underpinnings have been implicated, a precise pathogenic model 
of thought disorder remains elusive. Efforts to isolate pathophysiological mechanisms are 
likely confounded by sources of thought disorder variability that are not biologically-
based. Thus, explaining the relative contributions of environmental predictors is critical 
to the search for neurobiological mechanisms. While demographic, developmental, 
clinical, and state-related factors have all been shown to influence thought disorder, the 
combined effects of these predictors have not been examined. Thus, future research on 
integrative models of thought disorder is needed to better explain variability at the 
clinical level and, in turn, inform etiological mechanisms. 
The familial transmission of thought disorder is well-established empirically, 
suggesting a strong genetic component involved in its etiology. Further study of the 
familiality of thought disorder would greatly enhance the search for susceptibility genes. 
In light of accumulated evidence of shared risk among psychiatric disorders (Aukes et al., 
2012, Mortensen et al., 2010), examining dimensional systems of classifying family 
history, which account for variability in diagnosis and sub-clinical symptomatology (e.g., 
depression that does not cross the threshold of major depressive disorder) is warranted. 
Capturing the complexity of family history may provide a clearer picture of the familial 
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aggregation of thought disorder and help to distinguish genetic from environmental 
mechanisms.  
In sum, in order to gain a clearer understanding of psychotic phenomena, we must 
regain an appreciation for the “richness of psychopathology” (Brockington, 1992). The 
incorporation of dimensional conceptualizations of psychosis into theoretical and 
empirical paradigms is critical to this aim. Research into the correlates and moderators of 
dimensional constructs, including demographic and psychological factors, is critically 
needed.  Approaching research from a dimensional perspective has the potential to 
promote a more complex understanding of psychosis. 
 Bleuler saw thought disorder as the core defining feature of psychotic phenomena, 
reflective of the “splitting of the psychic functions” that occurred when, in the process of 
thinking, one’s ideas and feelings disconnect, becoming fragmented and competing 
functions. Unfortunately, interest in thought disorder as the conceptual core of psychosis 
was lost with rise of the modern DSM system, paralleling the shift towards a more 
simplistic, categorical way of defining psychiatric disorders.  
 This study sought to explore thought disorder from a dimensional perspective, 
with the aim of disentangling qualitative heterogeneity and diverse sources of influence 
transdiagnostically. The two primary objectives were to: (1) to demonstrate the feasibility 
and comparative utility of a dimensional approach to psychopathology research; (2) to 
examine a multifactorial, integrative model of thought disorder in a large, transdiagnostic 
sample (i.e. schizophrenia, schizoaffective, and bipolar disorder). Specifically, the direct, 
Study Purpose and Hypotheses 
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indirect, and combined effects of a diverse set of empirically-supported predictors were 
examined, which include family psychiatric history, sex, age-at-onset, and affective state.  
Overview of Proposed Model 
The path diagram presented in Figure 1 illustrates the hypothesized relationships 
among predictors. The model reflects a hybrid approach, which integrates categorical and 
dimensional frameworks. This approach has been recommended by several authors as a 
strategy for comparing dimensional and categorical classification (Krueger & Piasecki, 
2002; Peralta & Cuesta, 2003). The inclusion of categorical diagnosis as an independent, 
between-subjects variable is warranted for several reasons. First, because the domain-
specific approach has not yet been empirically-validated, examining the relationship 
between symptom dimensions and traditional diagnoses is informative (NIMH, 2009). 
This strategy is also valuable from a conceptual standpoint, as it enables integration and 
evaluation of existing research findings within a dimensional framework. The proposed 
model connects two primary domains of extant literature: (1) factors that explain 
heterogeneity at the diagnostic level and (2) factors that explain heterogeneity at the 
domain level (i.e. thought disorder). 
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Family history is a predictor of proband diagnosis, reflecting evidence of 
symptom aggregation within families (Aukes et al., 2012; Rasic et al., 2013). Age-at-
onset is also influenced by family history, supported by evidence of earlier onset of 
schizophrenia and bipolar illness in probands with a family history of psychosis 
(Gorwood et al., 1995). However, this relationship is moderated by sex. In non-familial 
cases, onset is earlier in men than women, while no sex differences are evident in familial 
psychosis cases (Esterberg & Compton, 2012; Gorwood et al., 1995; Malaspina et al., 
2000). Sex also moderates the association between family history and diagnosis, as the 
prevalence of affective and psychotic disorders tends to be higher in the relatives of 
women compared to men (Atalay & Atalay, 2006; Sham et al., 1994).  
The second part of the model illustrates correlates and moderators of thought 
disorder. A direct path is depicted between family history and thought disorder, reflecting 
Figure 1 






evidence of familial transmission. Family history and thought disorder are also associated 
indirectly through diagnosis. Although not conceptually meaningful, the examination of 
diagnosis as a mediator provides a comparison between categorical and dimensional 
frameworks by explaining the proportion of variance in thought disorder independently 
explained by diagnosis.  
Affective state is also included as a predictor of TD, with positive and negative 
affect differentially influencing idiosyncratic verbalizations and combinatory thinking. 
Positive and negative affect mediate the relationships between family history and thought 
disorder domains. This reflects evidence that patients with a family history of psychosis 
exhibit greater exacerbations of thought disorder in response to negative affect.  
Primary Research Questions 
(1)  To what extent is variability in thought disorder explained by affective state? 
Hypotheses: 
1a. Higher positive affect will be associated with increased combinatory 
thinking.  
1b. Greater negative affect will be associated with more severe 
idiosyncratic verbalizations. 
(2)  To what extent does family psychiatric history explain variability in clinical 
presentation? 
Hypotheses: 
2a. Probands with a family history of psychosis will have significantly 
higher scores on the idiosyncratic verbalizations factor.  
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2b. family history will be a significant predictor of affective valence; 
probands with family history of psychosis will have significantly 
lower positive affect than those without. 
2c. The direct effect of family history on thought disorder will be 
partially mediated by affective state (i.e. valence/intensity) 
(3)  What is the comparative utility of categorical diagnoses within a dimensional and 
multifactorial model? 
Hypotheses: 
3a. Variance in TD will be inadequately explained by DSM diagnosis 
alone. 
3b. Accounting for family history, age-at-onset, and affective state will 




 Data for the proposed study were drawn from a larger project on co-familial traits 
in psychotic disorders collected by Dr. Deborah Levy at the Psychology Research 
Laboratory / Mailman Research Center at McLean Hospital. The full dataset includes 
patients with schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, and bipolar psychosis, their first-
degree relatives, and healthy controls. Authorization to share data was granted by the 
Institutional Review Boards at both McLean Hospital and the University of Louisville.  
Analyses were conducted on a subsample of patients (n = 322) with schizophrenia 
(n = 79), schizoaffective disorder (n = 140), and bipolar psychosis (n = 103) who entered 
into the study between 1996 and 2010. Data collected through assessment of their first-
degree relatives (n = 439) were coded and included in the analysis.  
At the time of data collection, written informed consent was obtained from all 
study participants in accordance with the IRB guidelines of McLean Hospital. Probands 
(PRO) were recruited from an outpatient mental health clinic; those included in the study 
met DSM-IV criteria for schizophrenia (SZ), schizoaffective disorder (SZA), or bipolar 
disorder with psychotic features (BP). The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV 
Disorders (SCID; Spitzer, Williams, Gibbon, & First, 1994) was administered to all 
participants by a trained interviewer. Consensus diagnoses were made by experienced 
clinicians based on information obtained from the SCID, in conjunction with available 
hospital records. All probands who participated in the study met the following inclusion 
criteria:  
(1) Age 18 to 65-years-old 
Description of Dataset 
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(2) No diagnosed central nervous system disease 
(3) No substance abuse within the past year  
(4) Estimated verbal IQ ≥ 70 based on the Vocabulary subtest of the WAIS-R 
(5) Fluent English speaker 
(6) Absence of tardive dyskinesia  
 Thought Disorder. The Thought Disorder Index (TDI; Johnston & Holzman, 
1979) provides a system for identifying, categorizing, and evaluating the severity of 
disordered thinking as expressed in language. TDI scoring can be based on any verbal 
sample, including the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS), but is most commonly 
derived from verbatim responses to the Rorschach Inkblot Test (Rorschach, 1921). The 
Rorschach is believed to elicit greater instances of thought disorder than more structured 
methods (Johnston & Holzman, 1979), such as interviews (e.g., TLC) and non-projective 
tests (e.g., WAIS).  
As presented in Appendix A, the TDI includes 23 categories of thought 
disturbances, most of which were originally defined by Rappaport that fall along a 
continuum of severity, ranging from mild to severe (.25, .50, .75, and 1.00). The .25 level 
reflects subtle instances of cognitive slippage, which are commonly observed in healthy 
individuals, particularly in times of anxiety, stress, and fatigue (Johnston & Holzman, 
1986). Disturbances at the .50 level “convey[s] an impression of loss of mooring, shaky 
reality contact, emotional overreaction, and distinct oddness” (Johnston & Holzman, 
1986, p. 490). Significant instability in thinking and perceiving is represented at the .75 
level, while responses at the 1.0 level indicate a complete break from reality. 
Measures 
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 A global score can be estimated by summing all instances of thought disorder, 
weighted by severity level. Johnston and Holzman (1979) developed the following 
formula for calculating total TDI scores on the Rorschach (TDR):  
TDR= 
 0.25 (A )+0.50 (B )+ 0.75 (C )+1.00 (D) 
Total # Rorschach Responses
 × 100 
The weighted sum of scores is divided by the total number of Rorschach 
responses to control for verbal productivity and multiplied by 100. The authors chose to 
control for verbal output using number of responses, as it correlated similarly with 
weighted sum of scores as the exact word count and is less demanding to calculate 
(Holzman, Shenton, & Solovay, 1986).  
 Reliability. TDI total score has been shown to have good inter-rater reliability, 
with correlations ranging from .80 to .93 (Coleman et al., 1993; Johnston & Holzman, 
1979; Solovay et al., 1987) and an intra-class correlation (ICC) of .74 (Coleman et al., 
1993). Inter-rater reliability estimates for severity ranged from .86 to .93 (ICC = .77) at 
the .25 level, .56 to .75 (ICC = .72) at the .50 level, and .50 to 1.0 at the.75-level (ICC = 
.77) (Coleman et al., 1993). Due to low frequency of responses at the 1.0 level, 
correlations could not be calculated. In terms of qualitative factors, ICCs were .86 for 
Irrelevant Intrusions, .76 for Combinatory Thinking and .58 for Idiosyncratic 
Verbalizations. Confusion and Fluid Thinking factors could not be calculated due to low 
frequency of related responses. It was noted that larger discrepancies among rating teams 
were found in more disordered protocols due to the number of individual scores assigned. 
Factor Structure. The theoretical foundation of the TDI encompasses four 
qualitative dimensions of thought disorder, each defined by a subset of conceptually 
related categories. These domains include: (1) associative looseness, in which responses 
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appear to be driven by internal processes instead of demands of the task; (2) combinatory 
thinking, in which percepts, ideas, or images are joined in an inappropriate, incongruous 
or unrealistic manner; (3) disorganized responses, in which a lack of clarity of thought 
and sense of confusion are displayed; (4) deviant verbalizations, in which word usage is 
odd, idiosyncratic, or undecipherable (Solovay, Shenton, & Holzman, 1987, p. 18). 
Unfortunately, the theoretical structure proposed by Johnston and Holzman (1979) has 
never been tested empirically.  
The factor structure of the TDI has been examined in only one study. Solovay and 
colleagues (1987) conducted a principle components analysis in a small sample (n = 97) 
of patients with schizophrenia and mania. The resulting model specified six factors, 
which were labeled: (1) combinatory thinking; (2) idiosyncratic verbalizations; (3) 
autistic thinking; (4) fluid thinking; (5) absurdity; (6) confusion (Shenton et al., 1987). 
The idiosyncratic verbalizations factor, which was comprised of peculiar and queer 
responses accounted for the largest proportion of variance (17.7%). This was followed by 
the combinatory thinking factor (9.2%), which subsumed playful confabulations, 
incongruous combinations, flippancy, and fabulized combinations. While the names of 
these factors are shared with the original, conceptually-based domains, their definitions 
are not equivalent.  
Affective State. Positive and negative affect was measured through lexical 
analysis of transcribed Rorschach protocols using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count 
(LIWC, Pennebaker, 2001). The LIWC is an automated program that quantifies the 
proportion of words in a given text that fall into a set of pre-defined dimensions, which 
tap into various psychological processes (e.g., cognition, affect, personality), content 
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areas (e.g., food, space, family), and parts of speech (e.g., pronouns, articles, past tense). 
At the core of the program is the LIWC dictionary, which defines the composition and 
structure of linguistic dimensions. The dictionary was initially constructed within the 
context of exploring written expression of emotion, but has since undergone several 
revisions and expansions. The most recent version, LIWC2007, recognizes over 4,000 
words and word stems that reflect 72 linguistic categories.   
 The LIWC calculates several affect variables, which are arranged hierarchically. 
The overarching category, affective processes (915 words), is the sum of two discrete 
dimensions: positive affect (e.g., love, nice sweet; 406 words) and negative affect (e.g., 
hurt, ugly, nasty; 499 words). Negative affect is comprised of three narrower categories: 
(1) anxiety (e.g., worried, fearful, nervous; 91 words); (2) anger (e.g., hate, kill, annoyed; 
184 words); (3) sadness (e.g., crying, grief, sad; 101 words). While subcategories of 
positive affect (i.e. optimism, positive feeling) were included in the original dictionary, 
they were excluded from the latest revision due to low base rates. The remaining affect 
dimensions have been shown to be reliable indices. Pennebaker et al. (2007) 
demonstrated strong internal consistency of words within each affect category, with 
Cronbach alpha statistics ranging from .87 (anxiety) to .97 (positive emotion).  
The external validity of affect dimensions has also been evidenced. Pennebaker & 
Francis (1996) found a high degree of correspondence between LIWC scales and related 
ratings assigned by four independent judges. Strong correlations were reported for 
positive (r = .41) and negative (r = .31) affect, as well as subcategories of anxiety (r = 
.38) and anger (r = .22). However, there was significant discrepancy between LIWC and 
judges’ ratings of sadness.  The LIWC counts of affective processes have also been 
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shown to accurately capture responses to emotionally-provocative stimuli (Kahn et al., 
2007).  The LIWC has been used extensively in psychological research. This approach 
has been valuable for exploring affective processes in psychotic disorders, as cognitive, 
communicative, and symptomatic factors are known to confound self-reported measures 
of emotion (Cohen et al., 2008).  
In the current study, the LIWC was used to quantify the proportion of negative 
and positive affect words in transcribed Rorschach protocols. This methodology allowed 
for evaluation of affect and TD based on the same responses. All administrations were 
tape recorded and later transcribed verbatim by a professional transcriptionist with 
considerable experience working with Rorschach protocols. To prepare for LIWC 
analysis, electronic transcripts were edited to include only text that was spoken by the 
patient (i.e. examiner instructions/queries, transcriptionist notes were removed). 
Transcripts were then entered into the LIWC program to calculate the proportion of 
negative and positive affect words. Because the word “like” is used frequently in 
Rorschach responses when describing the blot (e.g., “It looks like”), we chose to remove 
it from the LIWC dictionary to control for erroneous inflation of the positive affect 
scores.    
Family Psychiatric History. Two methods were used to collect family history 
data: (1) direct diagnostic evaluation of relatives (i.e. family study); (2) informant-reports 
of psychiatric histories of all known relatives, collected through interviews with one or 
more relatives and probands who were able to do so. Relatives who participated in the 
study were administered the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV by experienced 
interviewers. The SCID has been shown to be a highly consistent instrument, with 
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excellent inter-rater (Skre et al., 1991) and test-retest reliability (Williams et al., 1992). 
Further, it has high specificity for most diagnoses, with the exception of substance use 
and antisocial personality disorders, which tend to be underreported (Andreasen et al., 
1977).  
Axis I conditions were diagnosed by consensus of expert clinicians, based on 
interview information and available medical records. The presence of Cluster A 
personality disorders (paranoid, schizoid, schizotypal) were evaluated in the same manner 
and classified into one of three groups: (1) Definite (DEF), full criteria were met; (2) 
Probable (PROB), 3 to 4 criteria were met; (3) Possible (POSS), 1 to 2 criteria were met.  
 The Family Informant Schedule and Criteria (FISC; Mannuzza & Fyer, 1990) was 
used to collect family history data. The FISC is a structured interview used to determine 
the presence of DSM diagnoses in family members, based on information provided by 
one or more informants. The interview process begins by identifying all of the probands 
first- and second-degree relatives, which helps to increase efficiency and accuracy of data 
collection. Information assessed through the FISC closely parallels traditional diagnostic 
criteria, but tends to be less stringent to account for the lower specificity of informant 
reports. 
 The family history method has been shown to reliably diagnose most disorders 
when a structured interview, such as the FISC, is used. Andreasen et al. (1977) 
demonstrated good inter-rater reliability for psychotic and mood disorders, with kappa 
coefficients ranging from .80 to 1.0. A later meta-analysis of seven family history studies 
reported moderate to high inter-rater reliability of schizophrenia, mania, depression, and 
substance abuse, while anxiety disorders were less consistently diagnosed (Hardt & 
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Franke, 2007).  The family history method is associated with high specificity for all 
disorders, but sensitivity tends to be lower and more variable across diagnoses 
(Andreasen et al., 1977; Andreasen et al., 1986; Fogelson et al., 2004; Hardt & Franke, 
2007).  
 Broadly, this approach has greater sensitivity for broader versus narrower 
categories. For example, Andreasen et al. (1986) found that sensitivity was low for 
schizophrenia (31%), but considerably higher for psychotic disorders (69%). The family 
history method also tends to have greater sensitivity for disorders characterized by 
externalizing symptoms, such as those of bipolar disorder (59 – 100%), compared to 
internalizing symptoms, as expressed in depression (50 - 62%; Andreasen et al., 1986; Li 
et al, 1997). Generally, observable symptoms (e.g., mania, delusions) are more accurately 
reported by informants, while subtle signs (e.g., onset, duration) and symptoms (e.g., 
guilt, self-depreciation) tend to be identified with less precision.  
Although the family history approach lacks the specificity and precision of the 
family study method, it is superior in terms of scope. That is, it assesses complete 
pedigrees, including relatives who are deceased or unavailable, thereby providing a more 
comprehensive picture of family psychiatric history. 
Familial/Sporadic Distinction. The familial/sporadic distinction has been used to 
distinguish differences in neurobiology, cognitive functioning, and clinical features. 
Results of neuroimaging studies have evidenced differences in ventricular volume 
(Reveley, Reveley, & Murray, 1984; Schwarzkopf et al., 1991), subcortical white matter 
density (Zetzsche et al., 2008), laterality (Malaspina & Friedman, 1998; Roy, Flaum, 
Gupta, Jaramillo, & Andreasen, 1994), and neuronal activity (Malaspina & Harkavy-
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Friedman, 2004) between familial and sporadic subtypes. Neurocognitive functioning has 
also been shown to differentiate groups. Greater impairments in attention, reasoning, and 
visual-motor ability are typically observed in familial cases (Erol, Bayram, Kosger, & 
Mete, 2012; Hallmayer et al., 2005; Sautter, McDermott, & Cornwell, 1994; Wolitzky et 
al., 2006), although conflicting data also exist (Chen, Lu, & Lung, 2011). In terms of 
clinical characteristics, it is well-established that patients with a family history of 
psychosis have a significantly earlier age-at-onset than those with no family history 
(Esterberg & Compton, 2012; Gorwood et al., 1995; Malaspina et al., 2000). Evidence on 
symptom differences has been much less consistent, as familial schizophrenia has been 
associated with greater negative symptom severity (Malaspina et al., 1996, 2000; 
Verdoux et al., 1996), lower negative symptom severity (Baron et al., 1992), and greater 
positive symptom severity (Kendler & Hays, 1982; Roy et al., 1994; Sautter & 
McDermott, 1994). While the family history method has yielded some compelling 
findings, inconsistencies among studies suggest that this approach may not adequately 
capture heterogeneity. 
Broadening the Distinction. The subdivision of schizophrenia into familial and 
sporadic cases is founded in the assumption that genetic liability to schizophrenia is 
discrete. When this approach gained recognition in the 1970s, isolating a susceptibility 
gene for schizophrenia was a viable research target. However, contemporary models 
suggest that the genetic underpinnings of schizophrenia are highly diverse, involving 
interactions among various genes and environmental factors (Svrakic et al., 2013). 
Further, there is increasing evidence that genetic liability to psychiatric disorders is 
shared, which refutes the notion of schizophrenia-specific risk on which the 
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familial/sporadic distinction is based. Population-based studies evidence familial co-
aggregation of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and major depressive disorder. 
Schizophrenia and bipolar disorder have the highest rate of family clustering (Aukes et 
al., 2012; Laursen & Labouriau, 2005; Mortensen, Pedersen, & Pedersen, 2010; Rasic, 
Hajek, Alda, & Uher, 2013), while a family history of major depression is associated with 
a two-times greater risk of schizophrenia than the general population (Aukes et al., 2012; 
Rasic et al., 2013).  
Despite the utility of epidemiological research, the indiscriminate diagnostic 
groupings (e.g., bipolar with and without psychotic features) inherent to this approach 
may lead to an underestimation of familial transmission of symptoms that present across 
diagnoses. Cross-sectional studies have demonstrated clustering of psychosis in bipolar 
pedigrees (Potash et al., 2001), as well as familial aggregation of mood symptoms in 
schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorders (McGrath et al., 2004). These findings 
parallel pathophysiological evidence, as a recent study found that distinct genetic variants 
cluster within families and relate to the manifestation of specific symptoms 
(Hatzimanolis et al., 2013).  
The significance of family history in the study of psychopathology has been 
increasingly supported by genetic and epidemiological research. This evidence also 
substantiates the use of family history as a clinical research strategy. However, in order to 
increase predictive power of family history, the traditional approach must be revised in 
accordance with contemporary evidence. Specifically, the definition should be expanded 
beyond the familial/sporadic distinction to account for a more dimensional view of family 
history. Presently, research exploring a broader definition of family history is limited. 
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Family history of affective illness has been demonstrated as a protective factor in 
schizophrenia, as it has been associated with better intellectual and neurocognitive 
functioning (Anglin et al., 2009), as well as better overall prognosis (Pope & Lipinski, 
1978). A significantly greater prevalence of depressive symptoms has been evidenced in 
schizophrenic patients with familial depression (Babinkostova & Stefanovski, 2011; 
Kendler & Hays, 1983; McGrath et al., 2004; Subotnick et al., 1997). 
 Coding of Family History. Despite their similar functions, the family study and 
family history methods have unique strengths and weaknesses as research tools. Given 
the current focus on familial aggregation of psychopathology, heuristically, we sought to 
capture the breadth of family history, while maximizing methodological rigor. Thus, both 
SCID and FISC data were used to define the pattern of illness in families. To maximize 
the quality of data, the operationalization of family history was restricted to first-degree 
relatives. Information on second-degree relatives was excluded because: (1) significantly 
fewer second-degree relatives were assessed directly; (2) informant reports of family 
history tend to be less reliable for more distant relatives with whom they presumably 
have more limited contact.  
Probands were assigned to one of four family history categories: (1) psychotic; (2) 
affective; (3) mixed; (4) other. Previous research has compared affective and psychotic 
family history groups, evidencing differences in age-at-onset (Kendler & Hays, 1983; 
McGrath et al., 2004), symptom presentation (Kendler et al., 2004; Peralta & Cuesta, 
2007; Subotnik et al., 1997), and cognitive functioning (Anglin et al., 2009). While these 
findings support the use of family history subtypes, the specific criteria used for 
classification have been highly inconsistent across studies. Because the relative utility of 
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these different approaches has not been established, we chose to examine two separate 
definitions of family history, one that employs stringent criteria to maximize the 
specificity of diagnostic categories (Narrow) and a second that has lower thresholds for 
group inclusion and thus has greater sensitivity. Specific criteria for each system are 
outlined in Table 1.   
Table 1 
Family History Classification Criteria for Narrow and Broad Approaches 
 Narrow Broad 
PSYCHOTIC  
(FH-PSY) 
(a) At least one relative diagnosed with: 
▪ Schizophrenia 
▪ Psychosis NOS 
▪ Delusional Disorder 
▪ Schizoid/Schizotypal (Full Criteria) 
(a) At least one relative diagnosed with: 
▪ Schizophrenia 
▪ Psychosis NOS 
▪ Delusional Disorder 




(a) At least one relative diagnosed with: 
▪ MDD, Recurrent 
▪ Bipolar disorder; AND 
 
(b) No family history of psychosis 
(a) At least one relative diagnosed with: 
▪ MDD, Single or Recurrent Episode 
▪ Bipolar disorder; AND 
 




(a) At least one relative diagnosed with: 
▪ Schizoaffective disorder 
▪ Bipolar psychosis; OR 
 
(b) Family history of: 
▪ Psychosis (narrow criteria); AND 
▪ Mood disorder (narrow criteria) 
(a) At least one relative diagnosed with: 
▪ Schizoaffective disorder 
▪ Bipolar psychosis; OR 
 
(b) Family history of: 
▪ Psychosis (broad criteria); AND 




(a) Family history of: 
▪ MDD, Single Episode 
▪ Schizoid/Schizotypal Traits 
▪ Other Axis I condition 
▪ No Diagnoses 
 
(a) Family history of: 
▪ Other Axis I condition 
▪ No diagnoses 
 
Note: FH = family history; NOS = not otherwise specified; MDD = major depressive disorder;  
 
 Specified Model. The predicted model specified both latent factor and path 
analysis components. Thought disorder dimensions were specified as latent constructs. 
However, because the factor structure of the TDI has not been well-established, the 
measurement model was tested separately, prior to estimation of the full model. Six 
Analysis Plan 
 48 
alternative measurement models were tested based on: (1) the conceptually-based factors 
established by Johnston and Holzman (1979); (2) the empiric factors derived from 
Principal Components Analysis (Solovay et al., 1987); (3) a one-factor model. The best-
fitting model was included in the structural analysis. The structural model included 10 
hypothesized paths between two latent factors and five observed variables: family 
history, age-at-onset, sex, negative affect, and positive affect. The model depicted in 
Figure 1 has 39 estimated parameters and 40 degrees of freedom; however, the exact 
properties of the final model were determined by the results of the factor analyses.  
Analysis Decisions. Data preparation and descriptive analyses were conducted 
using SPSS v22.0 (SPSS IBM, Armonk, NY, 2013). AMOS v22.0 (AMOS IBM, 
Armonk, NY, 2013) was used to test structural equation models (SEM). Statistical 
analyses were based on covariance matrices using maximum likelihood (ML) estimation, 
provided the assumptions of univariate and multivariate normality were met. Latent 
factors were scaled using the marker variable approach, which is suggested for hybrid 
models with endogenous factors (Kline, 2011; Sass, 2011). Analyses were carried out 
following a multistep process for estimating models with measurement and structural 
components (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988; Klein, 2011). The testing sequence included the 
following steps: (1) Evaluate whether the measurement model is consistent with the data; 
(2) Respecify the measurement model with empirically and conceptually supported 
modifications; (3) Test all omitted paths in the structural model and retain those that are 
significant; (4) Test all specified paths and correlations; (5) Estimate the full model.    
Model Fit Criteria. Model fit was evaluated based on multiple fit indices, as has 
been recommended by several authors (Brown, 2006; Hu & Bentler, 1999; Kline, 2011). 
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The chi-square statistic is one indicator of model fit, in which a non-significant value 
indicates adequate fit. Despite its utility, the chi-square statistic is sensitive to large 
sample size, multivariate non-normality, and strong correlations among indicators, which 
have been associated with inflated Type I error rate (Kline, 2011). Given this limitation, 
additional goodness-of-fit indices were used in conjunction with chi-square to evaluate 
model fit, namely the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), and the 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA).  
CFI and TLI are incremental fit indices that estimate the relative improvement of 
the specified model compared to the independence (null) model (Kline, 2010). Both 
indices yield estimates ranging from 0 to 1.0. The TLI yields similar estimates as the CFI 
but imposes stricter penalties on model complexity. A value of .95 is generally accepted 
as a cutoff for good model-fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999), while values >.90 suggest adequate 
fit (Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004).  
RMSEA is an absolute fit index that compares the specified model to a perfectly-
fitting model. Estimates, which range from 0 to 1.0, indicate the proportion of variance 
unaccounted for, and thus smaller values are preferred.  A value of .06 has been 
suggested as a cutoff for good model-fit, with a 90% confidence interval encompassing 
an approximate range of < .05 – .08 (Hu & Bentler, 1999). However, RMSEA has been 
criticized for penalizing models with small sample size and few degrees of freedom 
(Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004). To offset potential bias, the p of Close Fit (PCLOSE) 
statistic was interpreted in conjunction with RMSEA. PCLOSE tests the null hypothesis 
that RMSEA equals .05 and thus non-significant estimates (i.e., >.05) indicate a close-
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fitting model. RMSEA can also be used to compare nested models along with the chi-
square difference test (Sass, 2011). 
The chi-square difference test was used to compare the relative fit of nested 
models. A significant difference indicates that the more parsimonious (i.e. > df) model is 
preferred. For non-nested models, comparisons were based on the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). Lower values of the AIC and 
BCC indicate better model-fit, while a discrepancy of 10 or greater is evidence of a 
significant difference between models (Burnham & Anderson, 2002). 
Sample Size and Statistical Power. Given the complexity of structural equation 
modelling techniques, the stability of parameter estimates is reliant on large sample sizes 
(Kline, 2011). Unfortunately, there is no definitive approach for calculating sample size a 
priori.  In practice, sample size requirements are based on model complexity, although 
exact guidelines are inconsistent. A generally accepted rule of thumb is 10 to 20 cases per 
estimated parameter (Kline, 2010). However, there is some evidence that as few as 5 
cases per parameter is an acceptable ratio, particularly when using a robust estimation 
method, such as ML estimation (Tanaka, 1987). Based on these guidelines, the minimum 
sample size needed to estimate the proposed model is 175, although a more conservative 
requirement is 360 cases.  
Preliminary Analyses. 
 Demographic Characteristics. The sample includes 322 individuals diagnosed 
with schizophrenia (n = 103), schizoaffective disorder (n = 140), and bipolar disorder (n 
= 79). Demographic information is summarized in Table 2. Participants were 
predominantly white (91.9%) and had a mean age of 37.98 years (SD = 9.78), which was 
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consistent across diagnostic groups, (F = 2.77, p = .064. Men (n = 163, 50.6%) and 
women (n = 159, 49.4%) were equally represented in the overall sample. However, the 
sex distribution differed across diagnostic groups, with a significantly lower proportion of 
women diagnosed with SZ than SZA or BP. The Hollingshead Two-Factor Index 
(Hollingshead, 1957) was used to assess socioeconomic status (SES) based on parental 
education and income. Participants with schizophrenia had significantly lower SES than 
those with bipolar disorder; no differences emerged with respect to the SZA group, χ2 = 
7.69, p = .021. Compared to those with bipolar disorder, individuals with schizophrenia 
and schizoaffective disorder had significantly fewer years of education and lower verbal 
IQ scores (estimated from the Vocabulary subtest of the WAIS-III) (Wechsler, 1997). 
Table 2 
Demographic Characteristics of the Sample, Stratified by Proband Diagnosis 
 Schizophrenia 
(n = 103) 
Schizoaffective 
(n = 140) 
Bipolar 
(n = 79) 
Age, M (SD) 39.02 (9.62) 38.46 (9.39) 35.78 (10.41) 
Education, M (SD) 13.73 (2.59) 14.19 (2.12) 15.38 (2.39) 
Verbal IQ, M (SD) 99.33 (11.96) 100.89 (11.79) 106.58 (11.11) 
Sex, % male 69 (67.0%) 65 (46.4%) 29 (36.7%) 
Race, n (%)   
 White 92 (89.3%) 130 (92.9%) 74 (93.7%) 
 Black 5 (4.9%) 5 (3.6%) 3 (3.8%) 
 Asian 2 (2.0%) 0 (0%) 1 (1.3%) 
 Multiracial/Other 4 (4.8%) 5 (3.6%) 1 (1.3%) 
SES*, n (%)      
 I – III 84 (82.2%) 123 (89.1%) 76 (96.2%) 
 IV – V  17 (16.8%) 15 (10.9%) 3 (3.8%) 
Note: M = Mean; SD = standard deviation; IQ = Intelligence Quotient; SES = socioeconomic 
status 
 
* n = 318 
 
 Clinical Characteristics. Clinical characteristics, stratified by diagnosis, are 
presented in Table 3. Participants had a mean age-at-onset of 23.49 (SD = 7.42), which 
was consistent across diagnoses, F=1.28, p = .278. However, because of age differences 
at the time of testing, the mean duration of illness was lower in BP compared to both 
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other groups (F = 5.33, p = .005). Individuals with SZ and SZA exhibited higher scores 
on the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (Overall & Gorham, 1962) than those with BP, 
F=32.47, p < .001, indicating significantly greater symptom severity. Global Assessment 
of Functioning (GAS; Endicott, Spitzer, Fleiss, & Cohen, 1976) scores were also notably 
lower in the SZ and SZA groups compared to BP, F=55.46, p < .001. Taken together, 
these results suggest that, on average, participants with SZ and SZA experienced more 
chronic and severe forms illness.   
Table 3. 
Clinical Characteristics of the Sample, Stratified by Proband Diagnosis 
  Schizophrenia 
(n = 103) 
Schizoaffective 
(n = 140) 
Bipolar 
(n = 79) 
GAS, M (SD) 35.65 (10.01) 38.64 (9.64) 51.06 (11.69) 
Age-at-Onset, M (SD) 23.02 (6.89) 23.19 (6.75) 24.66 (9.05) 
Duration of Illness, M (SD) 16.13 (10.15) 15.28 (9.43) 11.55 (9.58) 
BPRS Total, M (SD) 50.17 (15.10) 46.36 (14.23) 34.32 (9.20) 
Chlorpromazine Equiv., M (SD) 633.18 (432.34)a 631.00 (609.05)b 406.68 (741.83)c 
Medication, n (%)    
 None 0 (-) 2 (1.43) 6 (7.59) 
 Neuroleptics only 27 (26.21) 14 (10.0) 1 (1.27) 
 Neuroleptics/Antidepressants 24 (23.31) 55 (39.29) 20 (25.32) 
 Mood Stabilizer 0 (-) 1 (.714) 12 (15.19) 
 Mood Stabilizer/Neuroleptics 28 (27.18) 46 (32.86) 26 (32.91) 
 Anxiolytic  12 (11.65) 20 (14.29) 6 (7.59) 
 Antiparkinson 16 (15.53) 19 (13.57) 2 (2.53) 
Note: M = Mean; SD= standard deviation; GAS = global assessment of symptoms 
 
a N = 98 
b N = 135 
c N = 48 
 
 Family History Characteristics. One-hundred and ninety-two (59.6%) probands 
had at least one family member participate in the study. Table 4 provides a summary of 
the relatives interviewed by proband diagnosis. The BP group had the fewest family 
members participate per proband (56/79; 70.9%) compared to SZ (147%) and SZA 
(139%). Interestingly, considerably more parents of SZ and SZA participants were 
recruited than BP participants. A total of 400 first-degree relatives completed the SCID-I. 
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Of this group, 21 (5.25%) were diagnosed with a non-affective psychotic disorder (e.g., 
schizophrenia), 17 (4.25%) with an affective psychotic disorder (e.g., schizoaffective 
disorder), 77 (19.25%) with a major mood disorder (e.g., bipolar, recurrent major 
depression), and 30 (7.5%) with a minor mood disorder (e.g., single depressive episode, 
cyclothymia). One-hundred and thirty-nine relatives (34.75%) did not meet criteria for 
any Axis I disorder. In terms of Axis II disorders, 17 (4.25%) met full criteria (i.e. 
Definite) paranoid personality disorder, 16 (4.0%) for schizotypal personality disorder, 
and 3 (<1%) for schizoid personality disorder.  
Table 4.  
Relatives Interviewed, Stratified by Proband Diagnosis 
 Schizophrenia Schizoaffective Bipolar 
Mother, n (%) 40 (26.5) 54 (27.7) 4 (7.1) 
Father, n (%)  23 (15.2) 37 (19.0) 3 (5.4) 
Sister, n (%) 54 (35.8) 66 (33.8) 32 (57.1) 
Brother, n (%) 31 (20.5) 34 (17.4) 16 (28.6) 
Son/Daughter, n (%) 3 (2.0) 4 (2.1) 1 (2.0) 
Total 151 (37.56) 195 (48.51) 56 (13.93) 
 
Missing Values and Outliers. 
 All participants in the sample had full data for each of the 23 TDI categories. 
Complete Rorschach transcripts were available for all but 7 participants; 4 protocols were 
not audio-recorded (due to technical difficulties) and 3 could not be located. Because 
verbatim responses are required for the LIWC, these cases were excluded from analysis. 
Further, 8 participants did not provide family history information and 5 were missing 
age-at-onset values. Taken together, a total of 302 participants had complete data for all 
variables of interest.  
TDI category scores were substantially skewed, reflecting the high frequency of 
zero usage for each type of thought disorder. Thus, factor analyses were based on 
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category scores that were: (1) weighted by their respective severity level; (2) controlled 
for number of responses; (3) mathematically transformed using a base-10 logarithmic 
function to approximate a normal distribution. Several categories could not be adequately 
corrected due to extreme infrequencies (neologism, idiosyncratic symbolism, 
contamination) and were excluded from analysis. 
LIWC variables were moderately skewed, such that there were high 
concentrations of scores near zero and several extreme values at the upper-range. 
Extreme values were carefully inspected and deemed to reflect true measurement 
variance; thus, all outliers were retained for analysis (a more detailed description of 
extreme values is presented below). Square root transformations were employed to 
normalize distributions of LIWC variables.    
Variable Descriptives. 
Table 5. 
Descriptive Data for Model Variables, M (SD) 
  All 
(N = 302) 
Schizophrenia 
(N = 96) 
Schizoaffective 
(N = 133) 
Bipolar 
(N = 73) 
TDI     
 Total Score 20.07 (21.85) 27.94 (29.96) 19.68 (16.94) 10.41 (10.42) 
 Idio. Verb. 4.50 (5.03) 5.68 (4.91) 5.08 (5.41) 1.90 (3.30) 
 Comb. Think. 3.33 (2.85) 3.37 (2.87) 3.69 (3.10) 2.62 (2.18) 
 Responses 19.71 (6.96) 19.20 (8.20) 19.95 (6.81) 19.96 (5.27) 
LIWC     
 NegAff .388 (.381) .424 (.537) .383 (.306) .351 (.229) 
 Anxiety .039 (.076) .042 (.088) .041 (.077) .032 (.053) 
 Anger .154 (.203) .171 (.274) .151 (.163) .139 (.156) 
 Sadness .064 (.103) .074 (.140) .061 (.078) .055 (.082) 
 PosAff 1.50 (.709) 1.49 (.778) 1.50 (.675) 1.48 (.686) 
PREDICTORS     
 Age-at-Onset 23.45 (7.33) 22.99 (6.87) 23.16 (6.73) 24.56 (8.80) 
Note: TDI = Thought Disorder Index; NegAff = negative affect; PosAff = positive affect 
 
 The FISC interview was administered to 398 relatives and 294 probands. Of the 
130 probands for whom no relatives were interviewed, 122 completed the FISC and were 
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deemed to be reliable informants. The remaining 8 probands were unable to provide 
accurate responses and thus, family history could not be assessed. FISC data were 
collected for 1,041 first-degree relatives, in addition to those family members who 
completed the SCID. Collectively, family history information was obtained for 1,435 
relatives, the equivalent of 4 to 5 relatives per proband. Using these data, probands were 
assigned to one of four family history groups: (1) psychosis; (2) mood; (3) mixed; (4) 
other. As described above, two classification schemes were examined, one with greater 
specificity (Narrow) and one with greater sensitivity (Broad). Table 6 presents the 
frequency distributions for each of these systems, stratified by proband diagnosis. As 
intended, in the Narrow system, a noticeably higher proportion of cases fall into the Other 
category, with fewer assigned to the Psychosis, Mood, and Mixed groups.   
Table 6. 
Family History Group Frequencies, n (%) 
Category 













Psychosis 15 (15.5) 15 (11.3) 6 (8.0) 50 (16.4)  18 (18.6) 14 (10.5) 4 (5.3) 36 (11.8) 
Mood 35 (36.1) 54 (40.6) 37 (49.3) 96 (31.5)  20 (20.6) 27 (20.3) 25 (33.3) 103 (33.8) 
Mixed 8 (8.2) 27 (20.3) 9 (12.0) 74 (24.3)  32 (33.0) 64 (48.1) 27 (36.0) 92 (30.2) 
Other 39 (40.2) 37 (27.8) 23 (30.7) 85 (27.9)  27 (27.8) 28 (21.1) 19 (25.3) 74 (24.3) 
 
LIWC Validity. 
While the LIWC has been demonstrated as a valid measure of affective state in 
the general population (Groom & Pennebaker, 2002), its use in psychiatric samples has 
not been well-established. Further, this is the first study, to the best of our knowledge, to 
use lexical analysis to examine emotion word use in Rorschach responses. Thus, 
preliminary analyses were conducted to establish that the LIWC was indeed tapping into 
the construct of affective state in the current sample. Specifically, we assessed: (1) the 
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convergence of LIWC domains with established measures of affect (convergent validity); 
(2) differences in affect scores across diagnostic groups (concurrent validity); (3) the 
characteristics of extreme outliers (extreme value analysis).  
 Convergent Validity. Clinical ratings of depressed mood (BPRS; Brief 
Psychiatric Rating Scale) and scores of self-reported social and physical anhedonia 
(CAS; Chapman Anhedonia Scales) were collected for a subset of participants (N = 191). 
In theory, the constructs tapped by these instruments are similar to that of the LIWC and 
thus should be observable statistically. However, given the differences in content and 
methodology, we expected only modest correlations between LIWC domains and clinical 
measures. As seen in Table 7, Social Anhedonia was significantly associated with overall 
Negative Affect (r = .199, p < .05), as well as the subdomain of Anxiety, while physical 
anhedonia correlated significantly with Anger subdomain. Clinician-rated depression was 
unrelated to all LIWC categories.  
While this could be due to the restricted range of the BPRS Depression item, the 
absence of significant correlations is consistent with previous research demonstrating that 
clinician ratings of affect are divergent from measures of subjective experience and 
outward expression (Halari, Mehrotra, Sharma, & Kumari, 2006). This is supported by 
the current results, in which BPRS Depression did not correlate significantly with self-
report anhedonia scales. Consistent with expectations, Positive Affect was unrelated to 
clinical measures of negative affect, which lends support for discriminate validity. 
However, Positive Affect also correlated modestly with Negative Affect; it is unclear 
whether this is indicative of poor construct validity or methodological overlap (i.e. word 
count). Overall, results suggest that the LIWC is a valid measure of negative affect in the 
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current sample, while further evidence is needed to determine the validity of Positive 
Affect.  
Table 7 
Correlations among LIWC Categories and Clinical Measures 
  LIWC CA T E G O R I E S   CL I N I C A L  M E A S U R E S 
  Affect PosAff NegAff Anx Anger Sad  BPRS  SocAnh PhyAnh 
Affect  1          
PosAff  .916** 1         
NegAff  .512** .165* 1        
Anxiety  .354** .102 .674** 1       
Anger  .361** .082 .770** .335* 1      
Sadness  .268** .165* .378* .153* .160* 1     
BPRS Dep  -.076 -.076 .020 -.001 .031 .053  1   
SocAnh  .112 .027 .191** .166* .123 .020  .031 1  
PhysAnh  -.005 -.086 .118 .050 .179* -.070  .107 .572** 1 
Note: LIWC = Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count; PosAff = positive affect; NegAff = negative affect; 
Anx = anxiety; BPRS = Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale; SocAnh = Chapman Social Anhedonia Scale; 
PhyAnh = Chapman Physical Anhedonia Scale 
 
Listwise N = 191 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
 
 Concurrent Validity. Construct validity was explored further by assessing 
differences in LIWC scores across diagnostic groups. Because the valence (i.e. 
depression, mania) and severity (e.g., criteria for duration/intensity) of affect are 
characteristics that differentiate disorders, we used diagnosis as a criterion for affective 
state. To increase the specificity of groups, individuals with past mood disorders (e.g., BP 
I, in full remission) or current mixed episodes were excluded from analysis. It was 
expected that those diagnosed with depression (i.e. SZA depressed type, BP MRE 
depressed, or SZ with MDD) would have higher Negative Affect, Anxiety, and Sadness 
scores and lower PosEmo scores than those without. Affective differences have also been 
evidenced among subtypes of schizophrenia, with negative affect significantly elevated in 
those with chronic compared to acute illness (Suslow, Roestel, Ohrmann, & Arolt, 2003). 
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Thus, we expected that individuals diagnosed with chronic SZ would exhibit greater 
Negative Affect, Anger, and Sadness than those with recent-onset or residual symptoms.  
Mean scores of LIWC variables for diagnostic groups are presented in Table 8. 
Results of a one-way ANOVA indicated significant differences among groups on Total 
Affect, F(3, 287)=3.34, p=.02, Negative Affect, F(3, 287)=5.51, p=.001, Anger, F(3, 
287)=4.05, p=.008, and Sadness, F(3,287)=3.95, p=.009. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons 
revealed that SZ chronic group exhibited significantly greater Negative Affect, Anger, 
and Sadness than the SZ and Manic groups, but did not differ from the Depressed group. 
No significant differences were found between the Manic and Depressed groups.  
Table 8. 
Means and Standard Deviations for LIWC Affect Variables Across Diagnostic Groups 
LIWC  
 SZ 
(N = 42) 
SZ, Chronic 
(N = 57) 
Manic 
(N = 144) 
Depressed 
(N = 48) 
Total Affect*  1.71 (.743)1 2.24 (1.22)1 1.91 (.748) 1.89 (.855) 
PosAff  1.33 (.662) 1.58 (.834) 1.47 (.654) 1.39 (.706) 
NegAff*  .283 (.211)2 .563 (.659)2 .352 (.251)2 .420 (.390) 
Anxiety  .035 (.048) .049 (.107) .032 (.056) .061 (.101) 
Anger*  .108 (.120) .243 (.351) .143 (.161) .161 (.189) 
Sadness*  .039 (.055) .099 (.173) .055 (.074) .050 (.070) 
* <.05 
1 SZ, Chronic > SZ 
2,3,4 SZ Chronic > SZ, Manic 
 
 Extreme Value Analysis. To supplement the empirical assessment of construct 
validity, we conducted a qualitative analysis of extreme scores (>3.2 SD above the mean) 
on each LIWC variable. Because, in theory, these values represent the most extreme 
affective states in the sample, we would expect them to be highly salient in the respective 
Rorschach protocols.  Table 9 presents a summary of extreme-scoring cases for each 
LIWC variable. Across Negative Affect categories, extreme scores were found to 
consistently correspond to protocols in which a striking degree of negative affect was 
 59 
expressed. This group of individuals exhibited a strong tendency to respond to the task in 
a self-referential manner. Several described feeling frightened, saddened, or 
overwhelmed by the blot, typically because of distressing personal associations. For 
example, in describing a percept, one woman (#5538) stated, “When I was younger, I was 
sexually abused... and this like reminds me... of… These are my feet, this is my crotch.  
An’ that’s the beast in there. It’s really embarrassing.” Others gave responses that were 
personalized and affectively elaborated, but had little bearing on the task at hand (see 
#3726 in Table 9). There was some indication that LIWC scores accurately differentiated 
dimensions of negative affect. For instance, the direct expression of fear, embarrassment, 
and worry was pronounced for those with high scores on Anxiety. However, there were 
other instances in which extreme-value protocols appeared to reflect generalized distress 
instead of specific dimensions of negative affect (e.g., #5313). Further, the range of affect 
expressed in protocols was often quite broad, with some participants exhibiting extreme 
scores on more than one dimension. These observations suggest that, in the current 
sample, Negative Affect is a more robust and valid measure of negative affect than the 
individual subdomain scores.  
 Consistent with convergent and concurrent validity analyses, the qualitative 
examination of extreme-values did not provide compelling support for the construct 
validity of Positive Affect. There were two extreme-scoring cases in this category, one of 
which did convey strong positive feelings in reaction to the stimuli (#3099). The second 
cases also had extreme scores on Negative Affect, Anxiety, and Anger (#8900). This 
individual’s style of responding on the Rorschach can be best characterized as 
paradoxical, offering descriptions such as, “that could be something at peace or 
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something at war” and “peaceful animals just show-, or peaceful people just showing 
their enemies.” Despite the high frequency of both Positive Affect and Negative Affect 
words, the overall tone of this protocol is negative. This pattern of scores was observed in 
several other cases, whose Positive Affect and Negative Affect values were both 
significantly elevated (i.e. 2.5 – 3.2 SDs above the mean), although they did not meet 
criteria for extreme values. 
Table 9. 







▪ Could be uh... somebody at war. (Um hm.) 'Cause it doesn't look happy to me... looks 
like it gets worse. 
3726 3.41 
(7.98) 
▪ Your orders were to kill on sight and.. and level the whole Dresden country to ashes. 
An' that's what they did to me. 
▪ And people were using me in nineteen seventy five. (People were using you?) Yes, the 
key year for the, for the battle of the planet. And.. I was caught in the crossfire of it. 
5538 2.26 
(4.94) 
▪ Kinda looks like two people havin’ a conversation. But it’s.. mm.. bad.  Their hearts 
are torn out. 
▪ Well there’s two people.. standin’ there.. the part in the red.. in the red.. in the middle.. 




▪ These are scary, they're, they're pictur-, they're pictures of uh.. (SIGHS) That could be 
something at peace or something at war, I don't know. 
▪ An' the doctor do-, doctor has to probably put all, together all these... interpretations 
because... isn't that a little too overwhelming to look at a-, every day, for everybody? 
5538 .57 
(6.82) 
▪ When I was younger, I was sexually abused... and this like reminds me... of… These 
are my feet, this is my crotch.  An’ that’s the beast in there. It’s really embarrassing. 
That’s what it reminds me of. I’m sorry. 









▪ Well, something was on fire, but it wasn't dead, and they want like, g-, they want, the 
devil wants most, a lotta people dead. 
3726 1.58 
(7.12) 
▪ ...an' a man gave me a book, an' then somethin' smashed through my phone. (Hm.) 
An'.. I think it was supposed, supposed to kill. Didn't kill me. It's a very evil place. 









▪ Tears... the tears were about the same distance from my eyes as the uh.. parts that 
looked like tears... made me sad looking at that one. 
5313 .44 
(3.71) 
▪ Looks like two people coming together in a violent collision... looks like blood 
3726 .42 
(3.51) 
▪ 'Cause the living EC Master.. does want, doesn't want me to have any happiness. He 




▪ I liked that one, I liked that one. Completely happy, that's when you're a child, play the 
violin-- ... That's a cello, an' uh.. they're tryin' to bring, if there's hate, the hate is 
subdued by uh, by music. 
▪ Um.. it's peaceful to me. It has color in it, lighter colors, like discord, like the fighting 
is gonna stop someday. 
3099 3.93 
(3.53) 
▪ A spaceship. That's a great-lookin' spaceship. Not a Vulcan spaceship but ... definitely 
a nice spaceship. 
▪ Sounds like a parade or something. That's a good feeling that gives me. Wow. Good 
feelings. I like that one. Great feelings. It's very emotional for me 
Note: ID = Participant ID#, Value = LIWC Raw Score; Z = z-score; Dx = Axis I Diagnosis; SZ = 
Schizophrenia; Chron = Chronic; SZA = Schizoaffective Disorder; BP = Bipolar 
Text in parentheses indicates examiner comment 
 
Summary. Taken together, results of these analyses demonstrate Negative Affect 
as a construct valid measure, which taps into the latent domain of negative affect. Results 
did not provide compelling support for the validity of Positive Affect in the current 
sample. Given that Positive Affect has been shown to be valid in research on non-clinical 
samples, it is possible that the scale functions differently in a psychiatric population. 
Discrepant findings may also relate to the unique methodology of the current study, as 
language elicited by the Rorschach is likely quite different from other sampling 
approaches (i.e. structured interviews). As discussed elsewhere, the task itself tends to 
“pull for” negative affect, which offers another possible explanation for the functional 
differences between LIWC scales. Regardless of the explanation, Positive Affect was 
excluded from further analyses. 
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Measurement Model  
 Model 1. Model 1 was estimated in the full sample, results of which indicated 
poor model-fit [χ2 (20) = 117.28 p <.001, TLI = .882, CFI = .916, RMSEA = .127, 
RMSEA CI90 = .105 - .150, PCLOSE < .001]. Large residual covariances were observed 
among measured variables. However, given the theoretical basis of this model (i.e., one 




 Model 2. Model 2 yielded marginal fit between implied estimates and observed 
data [χ2 (19) = 61.93, p <.001, TLI = .945, CFI = .963, RMSEA = .087, RMSEA CI90 = 
.063 - .111, PCLOSE = .006]. However, modification indices revealed large residual 
covariances between Peculiar and Confabulation scores. The respecification of a 
correlation between ePe and eCon resulted in a significant improvement to model fit. 







Model 3. Model 3 yielded a fair degree of consistency between model-implied 
estimates and observed data [χ2 (9) = 37.38, p < .001, TLI = .946, CFI = .967, RMSEA = 
.102, RMSEA CI90 = .070 - .137, PCLOSE = .006]. Large residual covariances were 
observed between eQu and Pe, which is consistent with the specified 2-factor PCA model 




Model 4. The 2-factor PCA-derived model was a close fit to the observed data [χ2 
(8) = 3.69, p = .884, TLI = 1.01, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, RMSEA CI90 = .00 - .32, 
PCLOSE = .985]. Residual covariances among indicators were insignificant. There was a 
modest correlation between factors (r = .64), indicative of related yet separable factors. 
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Despite statistical support for this model, it has fewer than three indicators per factor, 
which increases the likelihood of empirical under-identification, meaning that estimates 




Model 5. Model 5 was a poor fit to the observed data [χ2 (27) = 211.90, p < .001, 
TLI = .846, CFI = .884, RMSEA = .151, RMSEA CI90 = .132 - 170, PCLOSE < .001]. 
Specifically, there were large residual covariances were among several indicators, 




Model 6. The specification of Model 6 was informed by estimates from the 
corresponding one-factor model (Model 5), as well as results of the PCA and 
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conceptually-based models. Model 6 yielded estimates that were highly consistent with 
observed data [χ2 (19) = 26.66, p = .767, TLI = .991, CFI = .994, RMSEA = .035, 
RMSEA CI90 = .00 - .065, PCLOSE = .767]. The correlation between factors was strong 




Model Comparison.  Of the six models tested, there were two (Model 4 and 
Model 6) that demonstrated an adequate degree of fit to the data. Statistical comparison 
of these models based on AIC and BIC criteria (Table 10), indicates that Model 4 is 
preferred over Model 6. The strict penalty for model complexity inflicted by these 
estimates should be taken into consideration, given the considerable difference in number 
of parameters between the two models. Further, Model 4 does not meet minimum 
guidelines for empirical identification due to the number of indicators per factor, which 
increases the risk of unstable estimates (Brown, 2006; Kline, 2011). This risk may be 
exacerbated when estimated within the more complex structural model. Because Model 6 
was a good fit to the data and met all conditions for theoretical identification, it was used 




Statistical Comparison of TDI Factor Models  
  




DIFF (df) AIC BIC 
Model 1  117.28 20 .882 .916 .127  (.105 - .150) <.001 – – – – 
Model 2 54.89 19 .956 .970 .077 (.053 - .101) .031 .050 62.39 (1)*** 88.89 153.06 
Model 3 38.77 9 .942 .965 .104 (.072 - .139) .004 – – 62.78 119.41 
Model 4 5.16 8 1.01 1.00 .00 (.00 - .47) .959 .104 33.60 (1)*** 31.16 80.23 
Model 5 205.21 27 .849 .887 .147 (.129 - .167) <.001 – – 241.21 308.18 
Model 6 26.66 19 .991 .994 .035 (.00 - .065)  .767 .112 178.55 (8)*** 60.66 124.83 
Note: χ2 = chi-square test; df = degrees of freedom; TLI = Tucker-Lewis Index; CFI = Comparative Fit 
Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; 90% CI = 90% confidence interval; PCLOSE = 
p of Close Fit; χ2 DIFF = Chi-Square Difference Test; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion; BIC = Bayesian 
Information Criterion 
** < .01 
*** < .001 
 
 The structural model included a series of analyses, which were carried out 
sequentially. Specifically, we: (1) examined the comparative sensitivity of family history 
groupings; (2) tested omitted paths; (3) tested specified paths; (4) evaluated the overall 
model; (5) examined covariates; (6) evaluated the relative utility of categorical diagnosis 
within the baseline model.  
 Comparative Sensitivity of Family History Coding Schemes. To evaluate the 
sensitivity of family history categories to detect differences in clinical characteristics we: 
(1) conducted multiple-group path analysis to test invariance of structural paths in 
familial and sporadic groups, comparing across Broad and Narrow schemes; (2) assessed 
the relative effects of different family history groupings on endogenous variables using 
effect coding. 
 Multiple Group Analysis. We assessed whether differences in structural 
relationships between familial (i.e. family history of psychosis) and sporadic (i.e. no 
family history of psychosis) groups were better captured using Narrow or Broad family 
Structural Model 
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history criteria. Path coefficients were calculated separately for each familial and 
sporadic group and the magnitude of differences were compared across coding systems. 
As presented in Table 11, the relationship between Negative Affect and Idiosyncratic 
Thinking differed as a function of family history using both Narrow and Broad criteria. 
Specifically, greater Negative Affect was associated with more severe Idiosyncratic 
Thinking for those with a family history of psychosis, but not those without. Earlier age-
at-onset was also predictive of higher Idiosyncratic Thinking scores in the familial, but 
not sporadic, group. While this trend was consistent across coding approaches, the 
moderation effect did not reach statistical significance when using the Broad criteria. 
Table 11 
Comparative Sensitivity of Family History Coding Schemes 














Parameter Est. S.E.  Est. S.E.  z  Est. S.E.  Est. S.E.  z 
Sex → AAO .139 1.25  .092 1.13  –  .112 1.07  .099 1.32  – 
AAO → NegAff -.019 .007  -.031 .003  –  -.025 .006  -.004 .003  – 
Sex → NegAff .012 .093  .138 .039  –  .063 .076  .097 .042  – 
NegAff → IVa, b .407*** .044  .036 .039  -2.63***  .370*** .041  -.016 .038  -3.04*** 
NegAff → CT .166 .025  -.018 .046  –  .135 .026  -.013 .05  – 
AAO → IVc -.248*** .003  -.044 .001  2.14**  -.171*** .003  -.093 .001  – 
AAO → CT -.120 .002  -.053 .002  –  -.089 .002  -.073 .002  – 
Sex → IV -.129 .038  -.035 .021  –  -.135 .034  .001 .019  – 
Sex → CT -.097 .026  .019 .024  –  -.092 .024  .035 .026  – 
Note: Est. = standardized estimate; S.E. = standard error; z = z-score; FH = family history; AAO = age-at-
onset; NegAff = negative affect; IV = idiosyncratic thinking; CT = combinatory thinking 
** < .01 
*** < .001 
 
Effect Coding. We compared different family history groupings, in terms of the 
magnitude of their associations with model variables, namely Age-at-Onset, Negative 
Affect, Idiosyncratic Thinking, and Combinatory Thinking. Effects coding was used to 
assess differences among (1) Non-affective psychosis; Mood/Other; Affective psychosis; 
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(2) All psychosis; Other; Mood only; (3) All psychosis; Mood only/Other for both Broad 
and Narrow definitions of family history. Based on existing literature, we expected 
family history to account for variability in Age-at-Onset, Negative Affect, and 
Idiosyncratic Thinking.  Table 12 presents the standardized effects, goodness-of-fit 
statistics, and relative-fit indices for each of the six models estimated. No differences 
were found among affective psychosis, mood/other, and affective psychosis (B1, N1) 
regardless of whether Broad or Narrow criteria were used. The familial/sporadic 
distinction (B3, N3) explained significant variability in Negative Affect, with higher 
scores associated with family history of psychosis using both Narrow and Broad criteria. 
The second family history variable, which drew comparisons among affective / non-
affective psychosis, other, and mood categories, captured no differences when Narrow 
criteria were used. However, when defined by Broad criteria, this set of contrasts 
explained significant variability in both Age-at-Onset and Negative Affect. Further, it 
yielded the strongest correlation (albeit, not statistically significant) with Idiosyncratic 
Thinking of the six family history variables. While differences in fit statistics were 
negligible overall, the corresponding B2 model yielded the lowest chi-square, AIC, and 
BIC values, as well as the highest TLI and CFI values, all of which are associated with 
goodness-of-fit. Given these findings, all subsequent analyses of family history were 
based on B2.  
Table 12 
Family History Effect Coding 




 B1 -.052 .041 -.015 .051 100.08 .941 .959 .062 (.046 - .079) .109 164.08 283.13 
B2 .118* -.123* -.070 .021 97.68 .944 .961 .061 (.044 - .078) .137 161.69 280.74 
B3 .047 -.127* -.047 .029 98.87 .943 .960 .061 (.045 - .078) .123 162.87 281.92 
N a r r o w
 
N1 -.079 -.005 -.005 .051 101.47 .940 .958 .063 (.046 - .080) .095 165.47 316.52 
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N2 .048 -.103 -.030 .028 98.25 .943 .961 .061 (.044 - .078) .139 162.25 281.30 
N3 .040 -.139* -.067 .007 100.11 .942 .959 .062 (.046 - .079) .109 164.11 283.16 
 
Note: FH = family history; DSM Dx = DSM-IV diagnosis; AAO = age-at-onset; NegAff = negative affect; 
IV = idiosyncratic thinking; CT = combinatory thinking; χ2 = chi-square test; TLI = Tucker-Lewis Index; 
CFI = Comparative Fit Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; PCLOSE = p of Close 
Fit; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion; BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion 
 
FH 1 = Psychosis (-1); Mood/Other (0); Affective Psychosis (1) 
FH 2 = All Psychosis (-1); Other (0); Mood Only (1) 
FH 3 = All Psychosis (-1); No Psychosis (1) 
 
* < .05 
** < .01 
*** < .001 
 
Baseline Model 
Omitted Paths. Following the sequence recommended by Bollen (1989), the five 
paths omitted from the a priori model were tested first. As shown in Table 13, none of 
these parameters reached statistical significance and thus were not retained in the model. 
Table 13  
Estimation of Omitted Paths 
Parameter 
Standardized 
Estimate S.E. p-value 
AAO → NegAff -.014 .003 .810 
Sex → FH .047 .094 .409 
Sex → NegAff .067 .044 .238 
Sex → IV -.089 .021 .140 
Sex → CT -.038 .018 .517 
Note: S.E. = standard error; FH = family history; AAO = age-at-
onset; NegAff = negative affect; IV = idiosyncratic thinking; CT = 
combinatory thinking 
 
 Specified Paths. We then evaluated the nine structural paths that were specified a 
priori. Table 14 presents the standardized estimates and significance levels for each of 
these parameters. As predicted, family history of psychosis was significantly associated 
with earlier Age-at-Onset and more intense Negative Affect in probands. Interestingly, 
although family history had no direct effect on either TD domain, earlier Age-at-Onset 
and greater Negative Affect were significant predictors of Idiosyncratic Thinking 
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severity. None of these variables (i.e. family history, Age-at-Onset, or Negative Affect) 
explained a significant proportion of variance in Combinatory Thinking. While we 
hypothesized a positive association between Positive Affect and Combinatory Thinking, 
this effect could not be formally evaluated. Consistent with expectations, there was a 
modest association between sex and Age-at-Onset (male → earlier Age-at-Onset), 
although this effect did not reach statistical significance.   
Table 14. 
Estimation of Specified Paths 
Parameter 
Standardized 
Estimate S.E. p-value 
Sex → AAO .104 .838 .066 
FH → AAO* .118 .510 .038 
AAO → IV* -137 .001 .026 
AAO → CT -.083 .001 .164 
FH → NegAff* -.126 .027 .028 
FH → IV -.074 .013 .217 
FH → CT .024 .011 .686 
NegAff → IV** .273 .021 <.001 
NegAff → CT .092 .023 .122 
FH ↔ Sex .047 .024 .410 
Note :S.E. = standard error; FH = family history; AAO = age-at-onset; 
NegAff = negative affect; IV = idiosyncratic thinking; CT = 
combinatory thinking 
 
Model Fit. The fit of the overall model was then evaluated. Fit statistics indicated 
poor convergence between implied parameters and observed data [χ2 (57) = 368.93, p < 
.001, TLI = .744, CFI = .813, RMSEA = .134, RMSEA CI90 = .121 - .147, PCLOSE = 
<.001], due largely to substantial residual covariance among latent factors Idiosyncratic 
Thinking and Combinatory Thinking. The respecification of correlated disturbance terms 
resulted in a significant improvement to model fit [χ2 (56) = 142.63, p = .009, TLI = .928, 
CFI = .948, RMSEA = .071, RMSEA CI90 = .057 - .086, PCLOSE = .009, D RMSEA = 
.063, χ2DIFF (1) = 226.30]. Figure 2 depicts the final model, with standardized estimates and 
significance levels presented for measurement and structural parameters.   
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Figure 2. 




Model Fit Indices for SEM Model 
 χ2 df TLI CFI RMSEA (90% CI) PCLOSE D RMSEA χ2DIFF (1) 
Specified Model  368.93 57 .744 .813 .134 (.121 - .147) <.001 – – 
d.IV ↔ d.CT 142.63 56 .928 .948 .071 (.057 - .086) .009 .063 226.30 
Note: χ2 = chi-square test; df = degrees of freedom; TLI = Tucker-Lewis Index; CFI = Comparative Fit 
Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; PCLOSE = p of Close Fit; χ2 DIFF = Chi-
Square Difference Test 
 
Moderating Effect of Sex 
To assess whether structural relationships among variables differed as a function 
of sex, we estimated parameters for men and women separately and compared them using 
the Critical Ratio of Differences test. Table 16 presents standardized path coefficients for 
each group. Of the nine pairwise comparisons conducted, the direct effect of Age-at-
Onset on Negative Affect was the only parameter moderated by sex. For men, later 
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illness onset was associated with greater negative affect, while the opposite was true for 
women: earlier onset predicted more intense negative affect.  
Table 16 
Pairwise Comparisons of Structural Parameters by Sex 
 Males  Females  Pairwise Comparison 
Parameter Estimate S.E. p  Estimate S.E. p  C.R. Difference 
FH → AAO .111 .581 .160  .127 .845 .122  .487 .611 
AAO → NegAff .129 .069 .103  -.114 .055 .167  -2.14 -2.88*** 
AAO → IV -.141 .003 .101  -.123 .001 .161  .754 1.03 
AAO → CT -.099 .002 .241  -.078 .002 .357  .390 .711 
FH → NegAff -.159 .036 .044  -.097 .041 .241  .450 .511 
FH → IV -.120 .019 .161  .012 .014 .885  1.21 1.21 
FH → CT -.045 .015 .596  .099 .016 .241  1.21 1.21 
NegAff → IV .209 .044 .020  .363 .040 .002  .409 .791 
NegAff → CT .059 .033 .484  .127 .032 .132  .542 .737 
Note: FH = family history; DSM Dx = DSM-IV diagnosis; AAO = age-at-onset; NegAff = negative affect; 
IV = idiosyncratic thinking; CT = combinatory thinking 
* < .05 
** < .01 
*** < .001 
 
Covariate Analysis    
 Because previous research has indicated age, SES, education, and chlorpromazine 
equivalent as possible covariates of TD, we estimated the effects of these variables on the 
baseline model. Overall, the inclusion of covariates did not significantly change the 
nature of structural relationships among model variables. Negative Affect had a modest, 
positive association with CPZ, but was independent of age, SES, and education. No 
significant effects were found between covariates and TD domains, with the exception of 
a small, negative correlation between SES and Combinatory Thinking. We speculated 
that this relationship was spurious, reflecting variance in verbal fluency common to these 
variables. That is, verbal fluency is strongly related to SES and was applied as a 
correction to TDI category scores. Thus, we re-estimated this effect after controlling for 
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speech fluency (i.e. word count), which substantially attenuated the effect of SES on 
Combinatory Thinking (r = .08, p = .124).  
Affective State and Thought Disorder 
Consistent with our hypothesis, the intensity of negative affect significantly 
predicted the severity of Idiosyncratic Thinking, but was unrelated to Combinatory 
Thinking.  Specifically, each 1-SD increase in Negative Affect was associated with a 
.273-SD increase in Idiosyncratic Thinking, after controlling for all other variables in the 
model. Said differently, Negative Affect accounted for 7.45% of the variance in 
Idiosyncratic Thinking. Unfortunately, we were unable to examine the association 
between Combinatory Thinking and positive affect due to validity issues with the LIWC 
Positive Affect category.  
Family History  
 The model sought to address the extent to which family psychiatric history 
accounted for variability in clinical characteristics. Our prediction that family history of 
psychosis would be associated with more severe Idiosyncratic Thinking was not 
supported by the data. In fact, family history was unrelated to both qualitative and 
quantitative variability in TD. With respect to differences in affective state, family history 
of psychosis was associated with significantly greater negative affect compared to other 
groups. Family history accounted for variability in Age-at-Onset, as familial psychosis 
predicted significantly earlier Age-at-Onset compared to other family history groups.  
 Mediation of Negative Affect. To test the prediction that the relationship 
between family history and Idiosyncratic Thinking would be mediated by Negative 
Affect, we calculated the effect decomposition associated with the mediator. Figure 3 
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shows the direct and indirect effects among these variables. The inclusion of Negative 
Affect reduced the strength of the relationship between family history and Idiosyncratic 
Thinking, accounting for 27.2% of the total effect. The statistical significance of the 
mediated effect was evaluated using the Sobel Test, results of which indicated that the 
indirect effect of family history on Idiosyncratic Thinking through Negative Affect did 
not differ significantly from zero (z = -1.88, p = .059). However, because this is a highly 
conservative test that performs best with large sample sizes (i.e. >500), it is possible that 




To address hypotheses on the comparative utility of categorical and dimensional 
classification, we assessed the degree to which DSM diagnosis accounted for variability 
in TD factors independently, as well as its covariance within the baseline model. When 
estimated as the only predictor, diagnosis accounted for 9% of variance in Idiosyncratic 
Thinking, with higher scores on this factor significantly associated with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia (r = -.31). Diagnosis was virtually unrelated to the severity of Combinatory 
Figure 3 
Mediation of NegAff on the Relationship between FH and IV 
 
Note: all values are unstandardized estimates; parentheses indicate 
indirect effects 
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Thinking, explaining none of the variance on this factor. DSM diagnosis was then entered 
into the baseline model, specified as a predictor of Age-at-Onset, Negative Affect, 
Idiosyncratic Thinking, and Combinatory Thinking; the direct effects of family history 
and sex on diagnosis were also estimated. As found in the diagnosis-only model, 
schizophrenia was associated with significantly greater Idiosyncratic Thinking scores 
compared to the other groups (r = -.26, p < .001), but diagnosis was unrelated to 
Combinatory Thinking. Overall, the inclusion of diagnosis in the model explained an 
additional 7% of the variance of Idiosyncratic Thinking. Inconsistent with expectations, 
diagnosis did not account for differences in Age-at-Onset or Negative Affect, nor was it 
predicted by family history. There was a small effect of sex on diagnosis, such that 
females were more likely to be diagnosed with bipolar disorder and men with 
schizophrenia.   
Table 17 




FH → DSM Dx .095 .052 
Sex → DSM Dx .240*** .083 
DSM Dx → AAO .059 .578 
DSM Dx → NegAff -.056 .030 
DSM Dx → IV -.272*** .016 
DSM Dx → CT -.071 .012 
Note: FH = family history; DSM Dx = DSM-IV diagnosis; AAO = age-at-onset; 
NegAff = negative affect; IV = idiosyncratic thinking; CT = combinatory 
thinking 
* < .05 
** < .01 
*** < .001 
  
We then conducted a multigroup analysis to determine whether structural 
relationships differed as a function of diagnosis. However, because sample sizes were 
relatively small and unequal across groups, parameters could not be estimated and 
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compared reliably. Thus, we decided to collapse the three diagnostic categories into two 
broader groups: non-affective (SZ) and affective psychoses (SZA, BP). Family history of 
psychosis was predictive of earlier onset and greater Negative Affect in the full sample; 
however, when estimates were calculated for each group separately, this effect was found 
to be specific to non-affective psychosis, as was the association between Age-at-Onset 
and Negative Affect. Within the non-affective psychosis group, there were also 
significant effects of family history (psychosis) on Idiosyncratic Thinking and Age-at-
Onset on Combinatory Thinking, which were not present in the affective psychosis 
group. Due to difference in structural relationships, the model explained considerably 
more variance in Idiosyncratic Thinking for probands diagnosed with non-affective 
(24%) compared to affective psychosis (6%).     
Table 18. 
Pairwise Comparison of Structural Parameters by Affective and Non-Affective 
Psychosis Groups 
 Psychosis  Affective Psychosis  Pairwise Comp 
Parameter Estimate S.E.  Estimate S.E.  z 
FH → AAO .167* .718  .021 .717  -1.38 Sex → AAO .083 .601  .159 .579  0.51 FH → NegAff -.188* .041  -.045 .031  1.68* AAO → NegAff .039 .004  -.068 .004  -0.90 Sex → NegAff .067 .035  .143 .025  0.25 CPZ → NegAff .182* .000  .116 .000  -1.29 NegAff → IV .323*** .035  .103 .054  -1.30 NegAff → CT .147 .028  -.014 .044  -1.10 AAO → IV -.198* .002  -.003 .002  1.69
* 
FH → IV -.155* .019  .129 .019  2.45
** 
FH → CT -.022 .015  .109 .016  1.076 AAO → CT -.159* .002  .035 .002  1.589 Sex → CT -.003 .013  -.043 .013  -0.317 Sex → IV -.043 .015  -.100 .016  -0.382 CPZ → CT .027 .000  -.203
* .000  -1.79* 
CPZ → CT .13 .000  -.199
* .000  -2.74*** 
Note: FH = family history; AAO = age-at-onset; NegAff = negative affect; IV = 
idiosyncratic thinking; CT = combinatory thinking; CPZ = chlorpromazine equivalent 
* < .05 
** < .01 
*** < .001 
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Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to test a series of alternative TDI 
models. The best-fitting model (Model 6) indicated two distinct factors, which resembled 
idiosyncratic and combinatory dimensions. The idiosyncratic factor was defined by TDI 
categories characterized by overly-abstract, self-referential, and stilted responses. In 
contrast, categories loading on the combinatory factor reflect a style of responding that is 
conceptually organized, but perceptually-dominated, over-embellished and thematically 
bizarre.  
Figure 4 presents a synthesized illustration of significant results.  Overall, the 
baseline model, with the specification of CPZ as a covariate of Negative Affect, 
accounted for 11% of the total variance of Idiosyncratic Thinking and 3% of variance of 
Combinatory Thinking. Negative Affect emerged as the strongest predictor of 
Idiosyncratic Thinking (r = .27). This effect was comparable in men (r = .22) and women 
(r = .36), but differed as a function of Family History; Negative Affect had a significantly 
stronger effect on Idiosyncratic Thinking in those with a Family History of psychosis (r = 
.37) compared to those without (r = .02). Family History also moderated the effect of 
Age-at-Onset on Idiosyncratic Thinking, such that earlier onset predicted more severe 
scores in the familial (r = -.17), but not sporadic, group (r = .09). None of these 
predictors (Negative Affect, Age-at-Onset, and Family History) were significantly related 
to Combinatory Thinking, with no sex-specific effects.  
While Age-at-Onset had no effect on Negative Affect in the full sample, this 
relationship was significantly moderated by sex, with earlier onset associated with greater 
Negative Affect in women (r = -.11), but lower Negative Affect in men (r = .13). Family 
Summary of Results 
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History of psychosis was also a significant predictor of Negative Affect (r = -.12) in the 
full sample; however, when estimated for each sex separately, was found to be a male-
specific effect (M: r = -.16; F: r = .08). Negative Affect was positively correlated with 
CPZ dose, the magnitude of which was greater in women (r = .19) than men (r = .08). 
Due to sex differences in structural relationships, the variance in Idiosyncratic Thinking 
explained by the model was greater for women (16%) compared to men (8%). Similarly, 
given the moderating effects of Family History, variance in Idiosyncratic Thinking was 
better explained for those with a Family History of psychosis (19%) than those without 
(1%). There were no differences in Combinatory Thinking among groups.  
DSM diagnosis was a significant predictor of Idiosyncratic Thinking, explaining 
7% of unique variance when entered into the full model compared to 9% of the variance 
when estimated independently.  Thus, the portion of variance explained by diagnosis was 
largely independent of other predictors in the model; this includes Family History, Age-
at-Onset, and Negative Affect, which, contrary to expectations, were found to be 
unrelated to diagnosis. This was also true of Combinatory Thinking, which we expected, 
based on previous research, to be associated with bipolar disorder, but did not differ by 
diagnostic group. Sex had a moderate effect on diagnosis, such that women were 
significantly more likely to hold a diagnosis of bipolar disorder and men SZ. However, 
the effects of diagnosis on model variables did not differ as a function of sex.  
Structural relationships were found to differ between non-affective 
(schizophrenia) and affective psychosis (schizoaffective and bipolar) diagnoses. Overall, 
there was a pattern of more robust effects in the schizophrenia group compared to 
affective psychosis group. These differences in magnitude are likely due to the generally 
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higher severity of TD in the SZ group, contributing to a broader range of TDI scores. 
Family History of psychosis was significantly associated with earlier onset and greater 
Negative Affect, and Idiosyncratic Thinking in probands with non-affective psychosis, 
but had no effect for those with a diagnosis of affective psychosis. Similarly, the effects 
of Age-at-Onset and Negative Affect on Idiosyncratic Thinking were specific to 
schizophrenia, as was the relationship between CPZ and Negative Affect. Due to the 
differences in structural relationships, the model accounted for considerably more 
variance in Idiosyncratic Thinking for probands diagnosed with non-affective (24%), 





Bleuler saw thought disorder as the core defining feature of psychotic phenomena, 
reflective of the “splitting of the psychic functions” that occurred when, in the process of 
thinking, one’s ideas and feelings disconnect, becoming fragmented and competing 
functions. This view was echoed by Meehl (1962), who called thought disorder the 
“diagnostic bell ringer” for schizophrenia, which for him, was exemplified by the 
comment, “naturally I’m growing my father’s hair.” While Meehl cautioned that the 
presence of a single symptom is inadequate grounds on which to infer a nosology, he saw 
thought disorder as a “rare exception,” which itself was pathognomonic of schizophrenia.  
 Interest in thought disorder as the conceptual core of psychosis diminished with 
rise of the modern DSM system, shifting focus to more clearly-defined and readily-
observed indicators that would enhance the reliability of psychodiagnosis. The last 
several decades have seen mounting criticism of the DSM framework, prompting a 
movement to reform our scientific paradigm. At current, the pendulum appears to be 
swinging back towards a dimension-based approach to classification and study.  
With this shift, revisiting the significance of thought disorder in the 
conceptualization and study of psychosis is not only warranted, but timely. Theoretical 
and empirical foundations of thought disorder have supported it as a construct with a high 
degree of specificity (e.g., compared to hallucinations, which are believed to have highly 
diverse causal pathways). Thus, research in this area has the potential to elucidate robust 
etiological links, which, in turn, could inform individualized, effective intervention 
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approaches. The primary aim of the current study was to begin to disentangle the 
phenomenological and etiological heterogeneity of TD, through the application of a 
dimension-based, multifactorial, transdiagnostic approach. Above all, results illustrated 
the immense complexity of TD, in terms of both qualitative variability and the diverse, 
interactional sources of influence.  
 Much research on TD, particularly through the 1970s and 1980s, focused on its 
significance as a diagnostic marker. More recent work has explored broader scientific 
questions (e.g., regarding the cognitive and psychological underpinnings of TD), but has 
done so within the confines of diagnostic categories. We were interested in exploring the 
association between diagnosis and TD in order to better understand what diagnosis is, and 
is not, telling us about TD. Consistent with previous research, we found that diagnosis 
did account for differences in TD, with the SZ group exhibiting the highest severity of 
idiosyncratic thinking compared to SZA or BP. However, the interactions among 
demographic and clinical variables illustrated a much more complex and interesting 
picture of TD. Of note is the prominent role of negative affect, reminding us of the 
fundamental link thinking and feeling, even among individuals historically believed to 
have no emotion.  
  The data demonstrate a pattern of associations among family psychiatric history, 
age-at-onset, negative affect, and idiosyncratic thinking, suggestive of a developmental 
process specific to idiosyncratic thinking. This parallels findings from a diverse body of 
research that has explored the familial nature of thought disorder (Johnston & Holzman, 
1979; Docherty et al., 1999; Wynne & Singer, 1965). Across genetics, family linkage, 
and social-learning studies, using a range of measurement approaches, familial forms of 
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TD have consistently been characterized by idiosyncratic ideation, language, and 
reasoning. This has been explained from biological, psychological, and social 
perspectives, although the exact mechanisms remain unclear. While the current study 
does not help to parse out the sources of influence underlying the familial aggregation of 
Idiosyncratic Thinking, it does shed light on the broader developmental process.  
While family psychopathology is not analogous to family TD, they have been 
found to be highly correlated and both predictive of proband TD (Singer & Wynne, 
1965). Family History had no direct effect on Idiosyncratic Thinking in our sample, but 
shared an interesting association with Negative Affect. In those with a Family History of 
psychosis, Negative Affect was not only more intense, but strongly associated with the 
severity of Idiosyncratic Thinking. In order to interpret this, we must first consider the 
meaning of Negative Affect as it was measured in this study—in the content of 
Rorschach responses.  
Traditionally, affective content on the Rorschach, whether attributed affective 
qualities to the inkblot (e.g., “a menacing bat”) or in reference to one’s own emotional 
state, is thought to reflect a marked loss of distance from the stimuli, indicative of severe 
cognitive disturbance (Rappaport et al., 1946). In individuals with psychosis, this has 
been shown to occur in the context of self-referential responses, in which the intrusion of 
affect is tied to the “intermingling” of personal material, interfering with the perceptual 
process (Harrow & Prosen, 1978). While the influence of intermingling was not 
empirically assessed, our qualitative analysis revealed a striking patterns of distressing, 
personalized responses in those protocols with extreme Negative Affect scores.    
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The pattern observed among Family History, Negative Affect, and Idiosyncratic 
Thinking can be interpreted from a social-psychodynamic framework. From this 
perspective, cognitive and affective capabilities develop in childhood, as a function of the 
parent-child relationship. It is these interpersonal transactions that shape the way in 
which we perceive and make sense of surroundings, form concepts, process and modulate 
affect, and construct an understanding of the self and others.  When these early 
relationships do not provide the opportunity to establish a shared perspective or present 
inaccurate or inconsistent feedback about perceptual and emotional experience, the child 
may not develop an organized, stable representation of the self and world. The work of 
Wynne and Singer (1965) provides compelling support for this theory, linking parental 
disturbances in focusing attention, communicating, and interpersonal relating to the 
development of TD, as well as psychosis risk more broadly.  
Disorganization in family relations and communication is also a predictor of 
affective disturbances, associated with poor modulation of negative affect in both 
individuals with and without psychosis (Read & Gumley, 2008; Morris et al., 2007). 
Communication deviance within families has been found to predict a range of affect-
related outcomes, including poor eye contact, avoidance of emotions, and higher levels of 
distress (Miklowitz & Stackman, 1992). Families characterized as having a high level of 
CD have also been shown to exhibit greater cognitive deterioration during periods of 
emotional arousal, including difficulty with attention and concentration (Lewis et al., 
1981).    
This interpretation aligns with Bleuler’s early conceptualization, in which the 
loosening of associations between thought and affective processes, and the dominance of 
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inner life was the core of psychosis (Bleuler, 1911; Harrow & Prosen, 1978). A common 
notion is echoed in Vygotsky’s model of cognitive development, which he believed to be 
a largely social process, founded in cooperative and collaborative dialogue with 
caregivers. It was also at the core of his theory of psychosis, in which he describes “a 
separation of […] emotional expressions from the concepts with which they are closely 
associated. Taken together, this provides a strong theoretical framework through which to 
understand the relationship between distressing affect and TD.  
This interpretation of the data also corresponds with the stress sensitivity theory 
of psychosis, which has been one of the leading etiological models for many years 
(Walker & Diforio, 1997). Related research has consistently demonstrated that 
individuals with psychosis have a lower threshold for and heightened response to stress 
(Docherty et al., 1996). This is particularly true in familial psychosis, which has been 
linked to higher responsivity to emotional, interpersonal, and perceptual stimuli 
(Lancaster et al., 2010; Myin-Germeys & VanOs, 2006). In regards to the relationship 
between affect and TD, Docherty (1996) found that, when faced with emotionally 
provocative stimuli, individuals with a Family History of psychosis exhibited heightened 
reactivity, resulting in significant deterioration in the clarity of their language. While we 
cannot assume that a Family History of psychosis is analogous with disorganization of 
family communication or attachment, the commonalities among these two lines of 
research suggest that they are overlapping constructs.     
The Role of Age-at-Onset and Sex. 
 Age-at-onset also had an interesting pattern of associations within the model, 
lending further support to the developmental interpretation. Earlier onset age was 
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associated with a higher severity of idiosyncratic disturbances, which is consistent with a 
large body of evidence linking early onset to an overall more severe form of psychosis, 
including higher levels of TD (Kao et al., 2010). Interestingly, earlier onset has been 
found to characterize familial psychosis, a finding that was replicated in the current data 
(Husted, Greenwood, & Bassett, 2006; Kendler & MacLean, 1990). Individuals with a 
Family History of psychosis have been shown to have a significantly earlier age-at-onset 
than those with no Family History (Esterberg & Compton, 2012; Gorwood et al., 1995; 
Malaspina et al., 2000). While generally explained as evidence of genetic liability, the 
relationship between Family History and onset can also be interpreted within the context 
of a psychosocial process. That is, the magnitude of relational and attachment 
disorganization may be more pronounced in families with psychosis, which could lead 
the child to develop less stable, cohesive mental representations that put them at 
heightened risk for psychosis earlier in life.   
 Age-at-onset did not differ as a function of sex, which was unexpected given the 
well-established evidence that men develop psychosis an average of 5 to 10 years earlier 
than women; while this finding is most consistently reported in schizophrenia research 
(Goldstein & Lewine, 2000), it has also been replicated in samples with affective 
psychosis (Kennedy et al., 2005; Welham, Thomis, & McGrath, 2004) and sub-clinical 
psychosis (Spawen et al., 2003). Perhaps the most surprising finding that emerged from 
the data was the sex difference in the Age-at-Onset on Negative Affect in men and 
women. The intensity of negative affective was associated with later onset in men and 
earlier onset in women. We know that, in males, schizophrenia is characterized by earlier 
onset and restricted affect (Anglin et al., 2009; Lewine, 1981; Resend, Viglione, & de 
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Lima Argimon, 2009; Salem & Kring, 1998). Women, on the other hand, typically have a 
later onset, along with more intense experience and expression of affect (Anglin et al., 
2009). However, women with earlier onset been shown to present with clinical features 
similar to typical-onset men (Gureje & Bamidele, 1998). While this would suggest earlier 
onset to be predictive of lower emotionality in both men and women, findings come from 
diagnosis-based research, which may not apply to the current sample.  
Another possible explanation for this relates to the course of psychosis. In 
schizophrenia, negative affect has been shown to increase the longer one has lived with 
symptoms and spent hospitalized; this includes anger, fear, and guilt (Suslow et al., 
2003). Because men tend to experience earlier onset and a more severe, persistent course 
of psychosis, we might expect to see more intense negative affect in men compared to 
women over time.     
The methodological approaches used in this research are, in many ways, unique.   
The use of the LIWC to assess negative affect in Rorschach responses was novel; while 
preliminary support for construct validity was demonstrated, we recognize that questions 
may remain about psychometrics.  Second, as argued throughout this paper, the 
information contained in categorical diagnosis is inherently limited. Thus, despite the 
rigor with which family psychiatric history was assessed, it is a flawed marker of family 
differences. Given the limited specificity of groups, we must be careful not to over-
interpret the significance of Family History in the model. While results suggest that 
something is going on in psychotic families, what exactly that is, is purely speculative. 
Parsing out the specific mechanisms at work would be a worthwhile aim for future 
Strengths and Limitations 
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research. Given recent work on early adversity and attachment disorganization, exploring 
the effects of these factors within the developmental model would be particularly 
interesting. 
with potential implications for how we interpret and generalize the current findings.  
Finally, results are based on a predominantly white, well-educated, middle- to 
upper-class sample, which is not representative of the broader population. This is an 
important caveat, given that psychosis is more prevalent in low-income areas. Clinical 
features of psychosis have also been shown to differ in minority groups, including a 
higher preponderance of paranoia in African American men, which is linked to the degree 
of discrimination experienced. If poverty and discrimination are indeed risk factors of 
psychosis, as research suggests, then the developmental pathways underlying TD might 
look very different across sociocultural groups.   
Overall, these limitations are outweighed by the strengths of the study, including 
the large sample size, equal representation of men and women, and novel methodological 
approach.  
 The broad implications of this research relate to how we approach the 
classification and study of psychosis.  Broad diagnostic categories collapse important 
aspects of individual difference and variation, leading critical relationships to be 
overlooked. The dimensional framework presented a complex, interactional view of the 
data, revealing a pattern of relationships among variables that pointed to a developmental 
process. Such a nuanced, multidimensional perspective is more representative of human 
experience and thus better apt to elucidate links between psychotic phenomena and 
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diverse sources of influence. Shifting towards a constructivist paradigm has the potential 
to facilitate deeper understanding of the complex nature of psychosis. Related to this, the 
approach embodied in the current study supports a phenomenological, developmental, 
and psychological perspective of psychosis—something that has historically been 
underrepresented and undervalued in science and clinical work.  
 With regards to clinical work, dimensional research has the potential to provide 
detailed, precise information about the structure and nature of psychosis, which is a 
critical step in the development of individualized treatments. At present, antipsychotic 
medication remains the first, often only, treatment for psychosis, despite accumulating 
evidence that calls into question the efficacy and long-term safety of these drugs (Bolla, 
Lehtinen, Cullberg, & Ciompi, 2009; Harrow & Jobe, 2007). This reactive, one-size-fits-
all approach of treatment is a direct consequence of the categorical, medical model, 
which has worked to simplify how we conceptualize and treat psychosis. 
The dimensional framework has potential to shift attention back to a 
phenomenological view and bring with it an emphasis on proactive, person-centered 
approaches to treatment. Our findings draw attention to possible mechanisms of TD that 
would be feasible targets of psychosocial treatment. This includes affective reactivity, 
which, if it indeed has an exacerbating influence on TD, could be a viable mechanism of 
change for future interventions. Given a host of empirically-supported psychosocial 
interventions for affect regulation currently available, adapting this approach for TD 
would be a feasible and potentially fruitful endeavor.   
 Another important, albeit indirect, implication relates to the implementation of 
prevention efforts. The current results add to an already large body of evidence 
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suggesting that children in families with psychosis are at increased risk for a range of 
psychological problems (Miklowitz & Stackman, 1992; Wynne, 1994;). Regardless of the 
relative influences of biological and environmental causes, psychosis, like any other 
psychological, social, or medical problem one might face, is an undeniable source of 
stress for the individual and their family.  Further, because people with psychosis tend to 
have a higher sensitivity to stress and lack the personal resources needed to cope 
adaptively, the experience of psychosis itself has the potential to perpetuate further 
psychosocial stress. Unfortunately, traditional treatment models often fail to appreciate 
and adequately address the personal, social, and relational ramifications of psychosis, 
such as the impact of hospitalization on one’s family (including children) and personal 
identity (Holden & Lewine, 1982).  
 Not surprisingly, family interventions have been associated with remarkable 
outcomes, in terms of reducing subjective distress, reestablishing social roles, and 
reducing relapse (Alahen et al., 2000). The overarching perspective of these approaches 
is that psychosis develops within the social system, through a complex, interactive 
process, reciprocally determined by the interplay of self-environment factors (Aderhold 
& Gottwalz, 2004). With this is the assumption that psychosis is phenomenologically 
complex and understandable in the context of the unique dynamics of the family system.  
 Despite the effectiveness of family treatment, such approaches are not widely 
available. Addressing such issues more directly across mental health services, in addition 
to increasing availability of family-based treatment, could help to reduce the psychosocial 
risk factors for children in families with psychosis.  
Conclusion 
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Thought disorder is the central defining feature of psychosis. Thus, disturbances 
in thinking represent a unique and promising pathway through which to understand the 
nature of psychotic phenomena. Exploring this from a dimensional perspective has 
potential to contribute to a more comprehensive and integrative model of psychosis, 
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Thought Disorder Index 
 
 Level of Deviance 


















Responses seem to be dictated 
insufficiently by the task at hand; 
rather, they are heavily 
influenced by personal 
associations 
Looseness 
Subject responds with 
ideas that are either 
unrelated or arbitrarily or 
tangentially related. 
Associations are 
embellished in an 
idiosyncratic manner and 
may flow rapidly with no 
focus of conversation. 
The original point is lost. 
Fluidity 
A loss of object 
constancy due to 
the subject’s 
perception of the 




The response is limited to a 
single, clear-cut usage or 
rhyming or alliteration. 




A poor-form response that is 
repeated at least three times on 
consecutive cards 
   
Relationship Verbalization 
Subject either repeats a response 
previously giver of offers a new 
response, but relates the present 
response to the former one. 


















Response conveys no clear 
meaning; can include both 
meandering speeches as well as 
excessively short, cryptic 
statements that carry hardly any 
specific information 
Confusion 
Subject does not appear 
to be sure what s/he is 
saying, thinking, or 
perceiving or appears to 
be disoriented about time, 
place, or person 
 Incoherence 
A response that is not 
only unrelated to the 
task, but is completely 
impossible for the 
examiner to 
understand in any 
context 
Word-Finding Difficulty 
The search for a word that the 
subject appears to know but on 











Level of Deviance 



















Single details of a blot that 
are contiguous with each 
other are merged into a 
single response.  
Participant imparts too 
much reality to the images. 
Fabulized Combination 
Percept and related ideas 
are condensed into 
conclusions that violate 
reality; considerations 
about relationships 
between images, blot 
qualities, and objects. 
Confabulation 
Subject carries to an 
extreme an elaborative 
ideational tendency that 
extends the percept 





are merged into one. 
 Idiosyncratic 
Symbolism 
The use of concrete 
images or blot color to 
represent abstract ideas is 
scored when such 
symbolism is 
idiosyncratic and is given 
with an air of reality 
Autistic Logic 
Subject justifies a 
response by rationalizing 
it with a “because” 
statement that is illogical 
or based on private 
autistic reasoning 


























Odd words or phrases that 
may have a recognizable 
meaning but do not fit the 
context in which they are 
used; quaint, idiosyncratic, 
or private meaning 
 
Queer 
On continuum with 
peculiar but more severe. 
Examiner is generally 
uncertain about what is 




Almost totally arbitrary; 
bears little resemblance 
to objective reality. 
Scorer is unable to form 
an idea about the source 




responses that could 
be actual words, 





   DIAGNOSTIC GROUP 














OST; PT  
 ­under-inclusive 
thinking  (-) 
over-inclusive 





­poverty of speech, 
poverty of speech 
content 
 (-) 
­pressure of speech, 
derailment, 
tangentiality, 
illogicality, loss of 
goal 






­poverty of speech, 







­pressure of speech 
 (-) 
Harvey et al. 
(1984) TLC 
 
­negative TD  (-) ­positive TD  (-) 
Harrow & 
Marengo 
(1986) OST; PT 
 ­rate of relapse 4 years 
post hospitalization 










­global TD  (-) ­pressure of speech  (-) 
Shenton et 





resembled SZ  
Manic: 
resembled manic  
­combinatory 
thinking   (-) 
Solovay et 













 Poverty of speech, derailment, loss of goal 
similar to manics; ­reduction in derailment 
& loss of goal over time than manic  
­pressure of speech ¯TD than all other groups 
Braff et al. 
(1988) PT 
 Severity of idiosyncratic 
thinking equivalent to 
depressed group at 
baseline 
 (-)  (-) 
­reduction in 
idiosyncratic thinking 
at discharge compared 
to SZ 
Jampala et 
al. (1989)  
 ­tangentiality, 
neologisms, private word  (-) ­flight of ideas  (-) 










(1993) TLC SAPS 
SANS 
  ­poverty of speech, 









 (-)  (-) 
Docherty et 
al. (1996) CDI 
 







(1997) Severity Ratings 
 
¯ rates of TD remission 
over 7-year period 
compared to SZA group 
­association 
between the 
course of TD and 
psychotic 
symptoms 
­ rates of TD remission in non-SZ psychosis 
(MDD, bipolar, NOS) than SZ and SZA 




 (-)  (-)  (-) 




Negative TD most 
prominent in both 
groups 








score compared to those 
with “other” diagnoses 
and those without mental 
illness.   
 (-)  (-)  (-) 
Note: BGT = Bannister’s Grid Test; OST = Object Sorting Test; PT = Proverbs Test; TLC = Thought, Language, & 
Communication Scale; TDI = Thought Disorder Index; SANS = Scale for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms in 
Schizophrenia; SAPS = Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms in Schizophrenia; CDI = Communication 
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August 2015  ̵  Integrative Interventions Team, Co-leader/Peer Supervisor 
Present University of Louisville Psychological Services Center, Louisville, KY 
 
Assist in the facilitation of a specialty clinic in integrative psychotherapy at the 
Psychological Services Center (PSC), a psychology clinic that provides a range of 
services to the greater community on a sliding fee scale. The Integrative Interventions 
Team specializes in the evaluation and treatment of adults with severe 
psychological, behavioral, and interpersonal difficulties (e.g., psychoses, affective 
disorders, etc.), which are generally compounded by immense social stress and 
significant histories of trauma and adversity. As co-leader, I help to plan, 
organize, and run weekly group meetings for supervision and didactics. 
Additionally, I provide individual supervision to all new team members on a 
weekly basis and supervise several cases seen by senior student therapists.  
 
Supervisor: Rich Lewine, Ph.D. 
  
August 2012    ̵  Integrative Interventions Team, Student Clinician 
August  2015 
 
 
University of Louisville Psychological Services Center, Louisville, KY 
 
Provided assessment and psychotherapy services for adults experiencing complex 
psychosocial problems using an integrative and person-focused approach to case 
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 conceptualization that draws together relevant psychological, social, and 
biological mechanisms. Received weekly group and individual supervision that 
fostered conceptual and practical understanding of a broad range of psychological 
theories, principles, and empirical evidence. Gained experience with a diverse 
array of intervention models and techniques, drawing from cognitive-behavioral, 
psychodynamic, humanistic, interpersonal, narrative, existential and emotion-
focused paradigms. Provided peer supervision of psychotherapy cases for junior 
students on a weekly basis. 
 
Supervisor: Rich Lewine, Ph.D.  
  











University of Louisville Psychological Services Center, Louisville, KY 
 
Conducted evaluations for adults and children for a wide-range of referral 
questions.  Child assessment experience included evaluations for eligibility in the 
advance placement program at Jefferson County Public Schools. Adult cases 
were referred from a range of sources, including outpatient psychiatry, neurology, 
primary care, and the court system, for questions related to diagnosis, 
neurocognitive functioning, as well as disability and competency. Assessment 
batteries were tailored to fit the needs of client and referral questions, and 
included semi-structured and structured interviews, intellectual and achievement 
testing, neuropsychological assessment, projective techniques, standardized 
personality measures, and measures of functional ability, as well as self and 
observer reports. 
 
 Supervisors: Bernadette Walter, Ph.D. 
David Winsch, Ph.D.  
Rich Lewine, Ph.D. 
   
July 2013  ̵ Secure Care Unit Treatment Team, Practicum Student 
July 2014 Central State Psychiatric Hospital, Louisville, KY 
 
A year-long, 20-hour per week practicum, in which I worked as part of a 
multidisciplinary treatment team on an all-male secure-care unit that served 
patients in long-term forensic care, those admitted with a history of violence or 
sexual acting-out, as well as referrals from jail for treatment and competency 
evaluations. Primary responsibilities included intake evaluations, suicide and 
violence risk assessment, neuropsychological, personality, and cognitive testing, 
in addition to evaluations of mental status, malingering, and independent living 
skills. Met with patients for short-term individual therapy and relapse prevention 
planning, in addition to planning and facilitating a weekly therapy group. 
 
Supervisors:  James Gedra, Psy.D. 
                      Abby Stiff-Miller, Psy.D. 
  
August 2011   ̵  Geriatric Neuropsychology and Psychotherapy Team, Student Clinician 
October 2013 University of Louisville Geriatric Clinic, Louisville, KY 
 
Assessment: Conducted weekly neuropsychological evaluations in consultation 
with primary care physicians to assist in the diagnosis of dementia syndromes. 
Generated diagnostic reports which integrated data from cognitive and 
psychological assessments with information collected from patients, families, and 
medical records. Feedback was provided to patients and families, as well as to 
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referring physicians.  Select cases were presented at interdisciplinary care plan 
meetings. Provided peer supervision of assessment training, administration, report 
writing, and procedural/administrative tasks 
 
 
 Psychotherapy: Provided psychotherapy to older adults and couples experiencing 
late-life issues such as cognitive changes, depression, anxiety, grief, and 
interpersonal problems. Worked with caregivers of older adults who expressed 
feelings of burden, depression, or anxiety related to these responsibilities. 
 
Supervisor: Benjamin Mast, Ph.D.  
  
May 2012  ̵ Emergency Psychiatric Services, Practicum Student 
August 2012 University of Louisville Hospital, Louisville, KY 
 
Interviewed patients triaged into the psychiatric emergency room during morning 
treatment team, a multidisciplinary meeting that included psychiatry, social work, 
substance abuse counseling, nursing, and medical students. Collaborated in 
assessment of presenting problems and level of risk to determine need for 
hospitalization. Conducted phone interviews with family/friends to gain collateral 
information when necessary to inform treatment decisions. Contributed to 
conceptualization and disposition planning. 
 
Supervisors: Rich Lewine, Ph.D. 
                      Rif El-Mallakh, M.D. 
  
August 2008   ̵  GIFTS LLC Psychological Services, Masters Extern 
May 2009 Baltimore, MD 
 
Administered clinical interviews, standardized psychological assessments, and 
projective tests to children, adolescents, and adults; scored and interpreted data in 
order to synthesize outcomes; wrote formal psychological reports and conducted 
feedback sessions with clients and families. 
 
Supervisor: Akintude Morakinyo, Ph.D. 
  
August 2008  ̵  Baltimore City Public Schools, Masters Extern 
May 2009 HOPE Health Systems, Baltimore, MD 
 
Worked with elementary and middle school students in the Baltimore City Public 
School System. Led and co-facilitated group, individual, and family therapy 
sessions; conducted classroom observations and provided feedback to teachers 
and staff; assisted with crisis situations, providing interventions to students in 
distress, in addition to support and education to staff. 
 
Supervisors: Akintude Morakinyo, Ph.D. 
                      Mary King, LCSW 
    
O U T R E A C H  A N D  E D U C A T I O N A L  P R E S E N T A T I O N S  
 
Stress Less on Your Road to Academic Success, Workshop series developed for the University 
of Louisville Women’s Center (November 2015) 
 
Managing Stress and Promoting Wellness, workshop given for the Cardinal Covenant 
scholarship program (October 2015) 
 
Negative Thinking and College Success, invited talk for freshman students in General Studies 
course (September 2015) 
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Understanding the Dimensionality of Psychosis: Implications for Recovery-Oriented 
Treatment, educational talk presented to staff at Central State Hospital (June 2014) 
 
Stress Management and Your Career, invited talk for members of the Dress for Success 
organization (March 2013) 
 
R E S E A R C H  I N T E R E S T S  
Understanding the phenomenological and developmental complexity of severe psychological 
disturbances, specifically by studying unique dimensions and features of such experiences, as related 
to interactions among psychosocial factors and individual characteristics.  
 
R E S E A R C H  E X P E R I E N C E  
 
July 2011   ̵  
 
University of Louisville Affect and Cognition Lab, Doctoral Student  
Present Supervisor: Rich Lewine, Ph.D. 
 
A Study of Thinking and Feeling in Schizophrenia and Schizoaffective Disorder 
PI: Rich Lewine 
 
 Collaborated in developing study concept, methodology, and preparing IRB protocol. 
Recruited subjects from an acute inpatient psychiatric unit; administered study 
assessments: Rorschach Inkblot test, Wechsler Test of Adult Reading, Beck Depression 
Inventory, Beck Anxiety Inventory, Positive and Negative Affect Schedule, Big Five 
Inventory. Scored measures, managed database, and supervised undergraduate research 
assistants. Analyzed and interpreted data; presented findings 
    
May 2010  ̵   University of Maryland, College Park, MD, Clinical Research Associate 
June 2011 Supervisor: Jack Blanchard, Ph.D. 
 
Collaboration to Advance Negative Symptom Assessment in Schizophrenia  
PIs: Jack Blanchard, Ann Kring (Berkeley), Bill Horan (UCLA), Raquel Gur 
(UPenn) 
 
 National Institute of Mental Health-funded, multisite project to evaluate the 
reliability and validity of a new negative symptom assessment instrument, the 
Clinical Assessment Interview for Negative Symptoms (CAINS). Recruited 
participants from the University of Maryland Medical System community mental 
health clinics and Baltimore Veterans Administration. Administered structured 
diagnostic and symptom interviews, neuropsychological and performance-based 
assessments. Scored and managed data; coded interviews from other sites to 
evaluate inter-rater reliability. Attended weekly assessment supervision and 
didactics 
  
 Investigating Cognitive Models of Negative Symptoms in Schizophrenia  






VA-funded pilot study examining how perceptions of one’s self, illness, and 
environment relate to negative symptoms. Presented study to clinic staff at 
recruitment sites; recruited participants, collected and managed data. Conducted 
diagnostic interviews, symptom assessments, cognitive testing, questionnaires, and 
distress-tolerance/persistence tasks  
 
 Adapting Motivational Interviewing for Persons with Schizophrenia 
PI: Melanie Bennett, Ph.D. 
 
 VA-funded pilot study focused on adapting motivational interviewing to suit 
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individual differences in persons diagnosed with schizophrenia. Carried out 
administrative tasks, prepared study protocol and consent documents for 
Institutional Review Board approval 
  
R E S E A R C H  A S S E S S M E N T  E X P E R I E N C E   
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM Disorders, Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale, Scale for 
Assessment of Negative Symptoms, Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms, MATRICS 
Consensus Cognitive Battery, Brief Cognitive Assessment Tool for Schizophrenia, UCSD 
Performance-based Skills Assessment  ̵  Brief, Simpson-Angus Scale, Calgary Depression Scale 
for Schizophrenia, Chapman Anhedonia Scales, Internalized Stigma of Mental Illness Inventory, 
Rorschach Inkblot Test, Thought Disorder Index 
P U B L I C A T I O N S  
Waford, R., Lewine, R., Robertson, C., & Hart, M. (submitted). Negative and positive affect are 
differentially associated with characteristics of thought disorder in schizophrenia. 
Manuscript submitted to the Journal of Abnormal Psychology. 
Hart, M. & Lewine, R. (pending submission). Toward a dimensional and integrative 
understanding of psychopathology: Implications for a multifactorial, clinical model of 
thought disorder 
Hart, M. & Lewine, R. (pending submission). The nature of cognitive impairment in 
schizophrenia: A multiple-groups confirmatory factor analysis of the WAIS-R 
Hart, M. & Lewine, R. (unpublished manuscript). The moderating effect of family history on the 
relationship between executive dysfunction and thought disorder in schizophrenia.  
Lewine, R. & Hart, M. (unpublished manuscript). David Robeson Morgan: A case study that 
raises questions about the role of frontal lobes in complex cognitive processes. 
    
P R O F E S S I O N A L  P R E S E N T A T I O N S  
Martin, M., Lewine, R., & Hart, M. (October 2015). Typical and atypical gender roles in 
individuals with schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder. Poster presented at the 2015 
annual meeting of the Society for Research in Psychopathology, New Orleans, LA. 
Hart, M. & Lewine, R. (October 2015). Personalized associations and affective responsivity as 
predictors of thought disorder on the Rorschach. Abstract accepted for the 2015 annual 
meeting of the Society for Research in Psychopathology, New Orleans, LA (unable to 
present). 
Hart, M., Waford, R., Robertson, C., & Lewine, R. (September 2014). Exploring the relationship 
between affect and thought disorder in schizophrenia. Poster presented at the 2014 
annual meeting of the Society for Research in Psychopathology, Evanston, IL. 
Waford, R., Robertson, C., Hart, M., & Lewine, R. (September 2014). Does affective valence 
moderate thought disorder severity in schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder ? Poster 
presented at the 2014 annual meeting of the Society for Research in Psychopathology, 
Evanston, IL. 
Hart, M., & Lewine, R. (September 2013). Examining neuropsychological heterogeneity in 
schizophrenia through a broadened definition of family history. Abstract accepted for the 
2013 annual meeting of the Society for Research in Psychopathology, Oakland, CA 
(unable to present).  
Hart, M. & Lewine, R. (October 2012). Reexamining the relationship between domains of 
neurocognitive functioning and thought disorder in schizophrenia. Poster presented at the 
annual meeting of Society for Research in Psychopathology, Ann Arbor, MI. 
Waford, R., Robertson, C., Hart, M., & Lewine, R. (October 2012). Does affective valence 
moderate thought disorder severity in schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder? Poster 
presented at the annual meeting of Society for Research in Psychopathology, Ann Arbor, 
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MI. 
Robertson, C., Lewine, R., Waford, R., & Hart, M. (October 2012).  Examining the efficacy of 
subgrouping by FFM Personality Traits in Schizophrenia: An exploratory investigation. 
Poster presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Research in Psychopathology, 
Ann Arbor, MI. 
Hart, M., Bennett, M., Couture, S., Blanchard, J. (September 2011). The relationship between 
persistence, neurocognitive performance, and negative symptoms in schizophrenia. 
Poster presented at the annual meeting of Society for Research in Psychopathology, 
Boston, MA. 
Hart, M., Petrow, A., Bennett, M. (May 2011). Internalized stigma in a sample of individuals 
with schizophrenia. Poster presented at the annual University of Maryland School of 
Medicine Research Day, Baltimore, MD.  
 






Introduction to Psychology, Teaching Assistant  
Attended lectures and proctored biweekly examinations for two course sections of 
300 students; scored all examinations; generated grade distributions and statistics; 
uploaded and managed grades through online grade management system, 
Blackboard.  
Spring 2013 Psychology of Learning, Lab Instructor 
Planned and facilitated weekly lab meetings for two sections of 30 students; 
activities included conducting experiments in a virtual rat-training program, 
watching video clips and discussing illustrated learning principles; graded weekly 
written assignments and term papers; managed online course page through 
Blackboard   
 
Fall 2012 Forensic Psychology, Teaching Assistant 
Attended all lectures, graded tests and papers for 150 students 
 
Psychology of Personality, Teaching Assistant 
Attended lectures and learned course material; met with students on an individual 
basis as needed to review exams or discuss course material; graded 
exams/assignments for class of 150 students 
 
Spring 2012 Experimental Psychology, Lab Instructor 
Attended all lectures, planned and facilitated weekly lab meetings for two 
sections of 30 students; facilitated group exercises and activities related to the 
scientific method; conducting test review sessions; graded weekly written 
assignments and term papers; managed online course page through Blackboard   
 
Fall 2011 Psychology of Personality, Teaching Assistant 
Attended all lectures; provided additional support to students on an individual 
basis; collaborated in the development of exams; scored all exams and managed 
grade database  
  
S E R V I C E  E X P E R I E N C E  
  
2012  ̵  2015 Peer Mentor for incoming graduate students 
 
2012 Conducted free memory screenings for the community for National Memory 
Screening Day 
 
2012  ̵  2014  Assisted in planning and coordination of admissions interviews for program 
applicants   
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2011 Society for Research in Psychopathology: 2011 Student Contributor, Publication 
Committee 
 
2005- 2006 Volunteered at My Sister’s Place (Baltimore, MD), a day program that provides 
shelter, resources, and support to women and children struggling with 
homelessness and domestic abuse. Responsibilities included planning and 
conducting activities, serving meals, and assisting with administrative tasks. 
 
2004 - 2005 Volunteered at Frederick Ozanam House (Baltimore, MD), a half-way-house for 
men working toward independent living after being incarcerated, 
institutionalized, or homeless. Responsibilities included planning and carrying out 
activities and social events, as well as providing support and companionship to 
members. 
 
2003 - 2004 Volunteered at Baltimore Reads Inc. (Baltimore, MD) as a tutor and mentor for 
inner-city elementary school children experiencing academic and emotional 
difficulties, in addition to significant environmental stressors (e.g., poverty, 
neighborhood violence, family problems) 
  
P R O F E S S I O N A L  A C T I V I T I E S  A N D  A F F I L I A T I O N S  
 
American Psychological Association  ̵  student member 
          Division 12, Society of Clinical Psychology  
          Division 29, Division of Psychotherapy 
Kentucky Psychological Association  ̵  student member 
Society for Research in Psychopathology  ̵  student member  
International Society for Psychological and Social Approaches to Psychosis  ̵  student member 
Maryland Psychological Association for Graduate Students  ̵  student member 
R E L E V A N T  W O R K  E X P E R I E N C E  
 
November 2009  ̵  Special Education Teacher 
May 2010 Kennedy Krieger Institute, Baltimore, MD 
 
Created, facilitated, and evaluated lesson plans in compliance with 
Maryland State Department of Education standards; administered and 
interpreted informal student assessments; composed and presented 
Individualized Educational Plans (I.E.P.s); collaborated with 
professional staff in order to implement, monitor, and evaluate the 
effectiveness of Behavioral Intervention Plans 
 
May 2007  ̵  Teaching Assistant 
November 2009 Kennedy Krieger Institute, Baltimore, MD 
 
Supported lead teacher in lesson planning, instruction, student 
assessment, and classroom organization; responsible for grading 
assignments, recording behavioral data, and maintaining student 
records; implemented behavioral and crisis intervention plans; worked 
as part of a multidisciplinary team representing education, social work, 
psychology, psychiatry, occupational therapy, speech pathology, music 
therapy, and nursing to ensure coordination of services for students 
 
August 2006  ̵  Therapeutic Behavior Aide 
May 2007 Kennedy Krieger Institute, Baltimore, MD  
 
Worked one-on-one with a student with Fetal Alcohol Syndrome in a 
non-public special education high school; responsible for adapting 
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lesson plans and assignments to fit her needs and abilities; assisted in 
the development and implementation of behavioral intervention plans 
and tracked behavioral data; collaborated with teachers, social worker, 
psychologist, and psychiatrist to coordinate care 
 
P R O F E S S I O N A L  R E F E R E N C E S  
Richard R. J. Lewine, Ph.D. 
Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences 
University of Louisville 




    
Benjamin Mast, Ph.D. 
Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences 
University of Louisville 




    
Jack J. Blanchard, Ph.D. 
Department of Psychology 
University of Maryland 
College Park, MD 20742 
(301) 405-8438 
jblancha@umd.edu 
  
 
 
 
 
